

**Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding:
Case of Afghanistan**

Final Report

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Preface and Acknowledgments

Legitimacy in world politics has been the focus of both global attention and scholarly study in recent years, yet its role in peacebuilding has not been well studied. It is often remarked in both public and scholarly discourse that legitimacy is critical for success in creating sustainable peace in war-torn states; Larry Diamond, a political scientist who worked as a political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, asserts, “the first lesson of America’s experience in Iraq is that... any effort at administration and reconstruction of the post-conflict state must mobilize *legitimacy, both internally in the post-conflict country as well as internationally.*”¹

It appears to be a widely shared understanding that it is imperative for peacebuilders to obtain or construct legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders. Surprisingly, however, the concrete methods or policies to obtain this “local legitimacy” in the host states have not been fully examined. The objective of this report is to address this critical question by examining key policies regarding legitimacy construction in the specific context of Afghan peacebuilding. I plan to conduct research with the same question in different peacebuilding cases; accumulated case studies, I believe, will demonstrate policy implications for both ongoing and future peacebuilding efforts.

I wish to thank Carolyn McAskie, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, who introduced me and my research proposal to numerous UN peacebuilders and key officials in UN missions. In her letter, she endorsed my project as research “which will shed much-needed light on an issue which perhaps more than any other affects the success or failure of international peacebuilding efforts.”

¹ Diamond 2006, 34. Emphasis added.

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This paper reflects the views of the author and does not represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations or the Government of Japan.

I hope that my research and reports can make some contribution to ongoing efforts for peacebuilding in Afghanistan as well as future peacebuilding efforts in the world.

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Executive Summary

Introduction (Hypothesis and Methods)

The purpose of this research is to address the question, “what are effective policies for international and domestic peacebuilders to create domestic legitimacy in the process of peacebuilding?” In other words, the research seeks effective policies for peacebuilders to create “legitimate governments,” under which a majority of people comply with the rules of government in voluntary mode. Legitimacy is defined as power to pull compliance in a voluntary mode, not by coercion.²

In order to examine this question, **I hypothesize five key factors that might have critical impacts on constructing the legitimacy of newly created governments** in war-torn states; those five factors can be largely influenced by international actors who are involved in peacebuilding activities.

- (1) Role of the UN
- (2) Inclusiveness (Reconciliation)
- (3) Local ownership
- (4) Resource distribution (Peace dividend)
- (5) Use of force

The hypothesis of my research is that these five factors influence the compliance or noncompliance with key political developments, such as elections, constitutions, and disarmament of military factions, which are key components in the peacebuilding process. And repeated compliance with these political developments will enhance the creation of legitimate governments; on the other hand, repeated noncompliance will erode the legitimacy of governments (see Appendix 2).

In my hypothesis, there is one intermediate factor between these five factors and compliance behaviors: the **“credibility as impartial,” which peacebuilders should create and enhance**. For example, when domestic factions perceive that peacebuilders are credible, fair, and impartial, it is more likely that domestic factions will participate in elections and accept their results, as they can perceive that their participation will be treated impartially, and their political rights will be protected even if they lose elections. Establishing “credibility as impartial peacebuilders” would be also crucial for disarmament of military factions. International actors might be able to play a central role in creating this credibility in war-torn states.

Based on this hypothesis, I conducted field research in February 2008 (2 weeks) and May and June 2008 (6 weeks) in Afghanistan. I interviewed **key international peacebuilders**, such as the Deputy SRSG of UNAMA, the head of UNDP, the head of UNHCR, the head of WFP, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, and numerous UN political officers both at central and provincial levels. I also conducted individual interviews with **key domestic peacebuilders**, such as the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD), the Minister of Energy, the Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), as well

² Thomas Frank (1990) argues “legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or of the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority. It exerts a claim to compliance in the voluntarist mode.”

as an acting director of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D & R Commission) which is in charge of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), an acting director of PTS (National Reconciliation Program), and numerous government officials. I also interviewed over **40 local political stakeholders in Kandahar Province (Pashtun in South), Wardak Province (Pashtun in Central), and Kapisa Province (Tajik in Central)**, including provincial governors, members of provincial councils, tribe leaders, commanders, and regional heads of PTS. I also conducted an **opinion survey of 260 ordinary people** in Kandahar (50), Wardak (102), and Kapisa (108).

Key Recommendations

Based on the investigation of key political programs and the perceptions of people, I recommend the policies below as critical to strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government. The key recommendations relate to (1) DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups), (2) reconciliation, and (3) resource distribution (government services) and local ownership.

(1) DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups)

Although the DIAG program is making substantial progress in collecting weapons and disbanding illegal armed groups, the DIAG development project should be implemented much more quickly; **otherwise, DIAG will keep spreading mistrust against the government all over the country.** Concrete policies are as follows:

- Distribute the list of DIAG development projects that can be implemented within the DIAG budget ceiling to guide districts to make proper identification for the projects.
- Increase the staff to estimate costs of economic projects and implement them.

DIAG started in 2005 as a program to disarm about 1700 illegal armed groups targeted by the Afghan government. In DIAG, if 75% of weapons are surrendered by commanders in targeted districts, the district is supposed to obtain development projects. That exchange of economic programs becomes a big incentive for commanders to surrender weapons.

However, these development projects by DIAG are so slowly implemented that it continues to spread mistrust between the government and local political leaders. In Koh Band District in Kapisa Province, one year has been wasted just to select DIAG development projects after commanders surrendered more than 75% of weapons in 2007. The commanders in Koh Band were frustrated by the slowness of programs, perceived themselves cheated by DIAG, and started a commander union to oppose the government.

There are numerous cases in which DIAG wasted more than 4 to 6 months just to select the projects after commanders in districts fulfilled the goals of weapons collections. As for the overall picture, **in 43 districts where the DIAG Joint Secretary asked MRRD to start DIAG economic projects, DIAG economic projects were completed in only 2 districts (as of 31 August 2008).**

This slow implementation makes it more difficult for DIAG coordinators to persuade commanders in

newly targeted districts, because commanders oppose DIAG by saying, “We will not be cheated by DIAG. There has been no implementation of projects in complying districts.” One DIAG coordinator told me that this delay of implementation is about to kill the entire DIAG process.

The key failure is the process of choosing the development projects at the district level. It is mainly the District Development Assembly (DDA) that chooses DIAG development projects, and the DDA sometimes choose the programs from the list of District Development Plans (DDP), which are created by the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) in MRRD. This process creates over-expectation by people because the DDP list of projects tends to have much bigger budgets than the ceiling of DIAG (150,000 USD per district) and cannot be implemented.

The “DIAG concept paper” clearly requests DIAG projects to be linked with existing programs such as NABDP. It says, “The DIAG development component will be in line with existing development initiatives (such as NABDP)...it is envisioned that DIAG...would employ the NABDP project implementation structure for delivery of some of the community projects.”

This practice represents the typical problems of legitimacy construction. **The creation of over-expectation without clear explanation about the budget ceiling, as well as the lack of explanation about slow implementation of development projects, just keeps eroding the legitimacy of the domestic government and the international actors in charge of DIAG.**

The lack of staff to implement DIAG development projects is also serious. It takes almost 4 months just to estimate the costs of identified projects, while it is possible to complete an estimate in one month in other programs. Thus, what often happens is that 4 or 5 months after commanders fully complied with DIAG weapons collection and DDA selected the projects, DDA members and commanders heard that the DIAG cannot implement the projects due to the budget ceiling. Because the MRRD tends to show the big-budget projects to give commanders incentive to release weapons, commanders and community leaders perceive they have been “cheated.”

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that **a surprising majority of people in Afghanistan support the DIAG.** According to my opinion survey, over 95% in Wardak and Kapisa and 80% in Kandahar support the idea that commanders should surrender weapons; they believe that only after illegal armed groups are disbanded can security in their communities be established.

It is critical for the DIAG Joint Secretariat and the MRRD to create a modest list of projects that can be implemented within the DIAG budget ceiling, distribute the list to every District Development Assembly (DDA), and ask them to choose the projects from the list. Proper identification of projects in the initial stage is critical; the projects might be modest, but it is crucial to implement projects very quickly so that it can enhance the trust in the government.

It is also urgent to increase the staff specifically for implementing DIAG economic projects; the budget of DIAG might be small compared with other MRRD projects, but because the program involves key commanders and community leaders, swift implementation is indispensable to maintain the government’s credibility with local people and their leaders.

It is encouraging that both the head of UNDP, Anita Nirody, and the Japanese ambassador, Hideo Sato, recognize the criticality of this problem and have started making serious efforts to speed up the implementation. Their initiative needs to be supported by both Afghan and international authorities.

(2) Reconciliation With Insurgency, Including the Taliban

It is critical that all peacebuilders, including the Afghan government, UN organizations, ISAF, and American Forces engaging in counterterrorism, **share clear goals and strategies, form a new reconciliation committee composed of all the actors above**, and implement robust programs for reconciliation. Concrete policies would be as follows:

- Set clear goals and strategies by all peacebuilders, **including US counterterrorism forces.**
- Rearrange PTS (National Reconciliation Committee) and establish a new committee composed of Afghan government, UNAMA, ISAF, and US Forces.
- Start a massive program to create vocational centers all over the country for both Taliban soldiers who join in the reconciliation and other non-Taliban people.
- Pass a UN resolution to remove the Taliban members from the UN Sanction list if they join in the new reconciliation program. It would shake the “moderate Taliban leaders.”
- Negotiate with the “national Taliban,” who dislike the al-Qaida or Pakistan-driven terrorist infusions; it may open the window to include the “national Taliban” in the government structure.

The important background for the reconciliation is that people in Afghanistan overwhelmingly support the idea of reconciliation. According to my opinion survey, **94% in Kandahar (Pashtun), 98% in Wardak (Pashtun), and 86% in Kapisa (Tajik) responded that reconciliation with insurgent groups, including Taliban, is the first priority** to establish peace in Afghanistan. It is also important to recognize that 98% in Kandahar, 98% in Wardak, and 70% in Kapisa support the idea of a **coalition between Karzai and the Taliban.**

But actual reconciliation is very difficult in the current situation, especially because core members of the Taliban seem to have no incentive to make substantial concessions to the Afghan government, due to their ideological structure as well as their gaining territorial control. **Thus, the main target for reconciliation in the current situation is low- and middle-level soldiers who fight for the Taliban because of their economic and social needs;** actually, they are the majority of the insurgency. A provincial council member from Tagab district (insurgency-active district) said that if there are 420 Taliban soldiers in Tagab, 400 are working for the Taliban to obtain 100 USD per month; **they are not ideologically driven.** This view is supported by a majority of top government officials as well as international officials in Afghanistan.

In order to make substantial reconciliation with those people and low- and middle-level insurgent commanders, UNAMA, which was mandated for the reconciliation, should initiate a credible reconciliation mechanism and rearrange a new committee. The only mechanism for the reconciliation in Afghanistan now is the PTS (Strengthening Peace Program in Dari), led by the former president Mojadeddi and his son, who is acting director for PTS. In PTS, if individuals send an application

with the promise to follow the Afghan constitution, the PTS committee will review it and, if appropriate, the Afghan government sends the letters to promise not to detain or kill those individuals. There are about 4600 individuals who had joined PTS by the end of 2007.

Unfortunately, the PTS already lost credibility from both Afghan people and the international community. The main reasons are the following:

- (1) Taliban members who joined PTS have no guarantee of safety from the international forces, especially from American counterterrorism operations.
- (2) Taliban members who joined PTS have no way to make a living after they cut links to and salaries from the Taliban.
- (3) Taliban members who joined PTS would be targeted by Taliban retaliation, and the government cannot protect them.

In terms of lack of safety from international forces, there are several prominent cases in which members who joined the PTS were attacked by American forces. For example, in Alasay District in Kapisa Province, one former Taliban commander, who controlled over 50 Taliban former soldiers, was invited by the Provincial Council members in Kapisa to join the PTS and work for the provincial government. The former commander joined PTS in the summer of 2007 and actively cooperated with the provincial government. Two month later (in the fall of 2007), he was invited by US forces to come to Graham Base for a meeting and was arrested by US forces. After this arrest, people from Alasay District stopped joining PTS. This story was spread all over the central regions.

In terms of lack of employment, it is obvious that former Taliban soldiers who joined PTS tend to have extreme difficulty making a living, as the overall employment situation is so harsh. It is one of the main reasons why many people keep working for the Taliban. **As for lack of safety from the Taliban**, if the Taliban tries to retaliate against those who joined PTS, it is difficult for the Afghan government to protect them, as many areas in Pashtun do not have functioning police.

There is also concern about PTS credibility and accountability in the international community. For those reasons, it seems difficult for the international community to provide PTS with substantial funding for massive economic projects in coordination with the reconciliation program.

That is why I propose that it is vital for UNAMA to initiate rearranging a new reconciliation committee composed of every important actor, such as the Presidential Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, UNAMA, ISAF, and American Counterterrorism Forces. The PTS committee can be integrated into this new committee. **When the new reconciliation committee issues a guarantee to former Taliban who join in the new reconciliation program, the guarantee should be shared by every actor.** It can guarantee, at least, safety from international forces.

It is not actually a huge step, at least in theory. The current PTS is supposed to give former Taliban the guarantee of no custody or attack from both the Afghan government and ISAF (international forces); only American forces will join the new committee. But it is vital to have every actor in the same boat for the reconciliation.

It is also crucial for UNAMA to initiate talks between the Afghan government, International Forces, American Forces, and UNAMA to share clear goals and strategies. President Karzai's decision to deport two international staff who contacted heads of the Taliban organization stopped many UNAMA staff from attempting reconciliation efforts with insurgent commanders and groups.

After clear goals and strategies are confirmed by the main actors above, the new reconciliation committee would start a **massive program to create vocational centers all over the country.** The significant way to encourage former Taliban soldiers to join the reconciliation would be to create sustainable job opportunities after the reconciliation, and many vocational centers in entire regions can encourage many Afghan Taliban soldiers to join the reconciliation program.

It is important for vocational centers to accept both former Taliban joining in reconciliation and other non-Taliban villagers, as (1) it can treat both former Taliban and non-Taliban equally, and (2) it might have a preventive effect on the attacks from Taliban retaliation because of the popularity of vocational centers in communities.

The need to increase employment opportunities is very urgent; **according to my opinion poll, 46% in Kandahar and Wardak and 36% in Kapisa answered that their employment is worse compared with three years ago.** As I will write in the next section, projects by the Community Development Council (CDC) are extremely popular among Afghan people. When vocational centers decide the program of training, it would be beneficial to consult with CDC members and try to create the best training programs for different industries and agriculture in each region. Training programs can be linked with future CDC economic projects as well as small credit programs, to create small enterprises in local areas, such as the Afghan Rural Enterprise Development Program. (Many Pakistanis are coming to Kandahar for construction jobs, as many Afghans do not have skills for those jobs; vocational centers can create substantial job opportunities.)

Additionally, to enhance the reconciliation with core but flexible Taliban leaders, it is crucial for the UN Security Council to make a new resolution that **if Taliban on the UN Sanction list decide to join the new reconciliation program, they will be removed from the list** (Now there are about 20 Taliban former leaders on the list who have already joined the PTS). This discussion has continued for 4 years in the UN Security Council; it is time to make a critical decision to induce some Taliban leaders to the side of the government.

Although it may be difficult to induce concessions from core members of the Taliban, especially Pakistan- or al-Qaida-driven Taliban who are "international Taliban," it is still possible to negotiate with "Afghan Taliban" whose main objective is to control their country themselves and who need to have economic opportunities for survival. One of the critical policies could be **to reconcile with these "national insurgents" and transform them into government officials, including local security forces or police** who are paid an adequate salary. It is important for the government to obtain clear-cut control over these new government officials but give them incentive to support the government and to exclude the Pakistan- or al-Qaida-driven Taliban from their regions.

The International Forces are still important to increase the cost for the Taliban and to motivate "national Taliban" commanders and soldiers to consider reconciliation. But without reconciliation,

military operations alone can push them into a corner and decisive fighting for a long time in the future. Afghanistan has only one year left before the next presidential election. It is time to make a decision on reconciliation.

(3) Resource Distribution (Government Service) and Local Ownership

The importance of improving the resource distribution (peace dividend) in increasing the legitimacy of Afghan government is without question; every top minister of the Afghan government and top leaders of UN organizations I interviewed share the view on how important it is to improve economic conditions for constructing legitimacy. A top official of UN agency told me, **“Legitimacy of the government comes from electricity, not from only elections in this fragile state!”**

At the same time, every Afghan leader I interviewed emphasized that **it is critical to implement economic assistance with visible government involvement**; otherwise, the assistance might enhance the legitimacy of “donors,” but not strengthen legitimacy of both the central and local governments.

In that sense, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is one of the biggest development projects that created over 20,000 Community Development Councils at the village level across Afghanistan, is very informative; according to my opinion survey, **92% in Kandahar, 84% in Wardak, and 95% in Kapisa answered that they are satisfied with the results of the CDC. The key reason is that people can make decisions about the projects they implement**; local ownership does matter in increasing the support of people and then strengthening the legitimacy of the government. Many villagers I interviewed argue that “The CDC project was the only hope that we could see since the peacebuilding started in 2001.”

The critical challenge, though, is the sustainability of CDC projects. Once the Afghan National Trust Fund stops sending funds to CDCs (it may occur in 2009), the majority of CDCs seem to stop functioning, especially in implementing new projects. Thus, the recommendations for NSP are:

- Create an international fund mechanism to sustain the NSP that keeps CDC projects in each village.
- Encourage CDC projects that have long-term employment opportunities, linked with possible vocational centers across the country.

The creation of international mechanisms to sustain community projects is urgent, as it would destroy the trust between people and governments if more than 20,000 CDCs were dissolved after only one or two projects were implemented. One of the key programs could be to sustain CDC projects but encourage communities to initiate projects that create long-term employment, such as irrigation or food processing. The possible vocational centers for reconciliation could be linked with long-term projects by CDCs.

To enhance the legitimacy of the government, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) also need to have more substantial discussions with local governments at provincial and district levels. **PRT**

projects need to be perceived as the result of collaboration between local governments and the PRT, so that the achievement of projects can increase the legitimacy of local governments. Many local government officials complained that the PRT did not contribute to the increase of trust in local government. The cooperation of the PRT and local government might delay the implementation, but it is crucial for the PRT, whose objective is defined as to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government, to make substantial changes in operating its projects.

In return for providing local governments with visibility as local government projects, the international actors should be allowed to strengthen monitoring projects; erasing the perception of corruption is also crucial in restoring the trust in local governments.

Lesson From the Past

There are several missed opportunities that were expressed by top government and UN officials.

(1) Reconciliation with Taliban in 2002 to 2003

It is amazing that a majority of top leaders of the Afghan government and UN officials share the view that they could have made reconciliation even with core Taliban members in 2002 or 2003, when the Taliban was very weak and marginalized; substantial factions of the Taliban would have surrendered their weapons and participated in the 2005 congress elections. Brahimi, the former SRSG in Afghanistan, states officially that it was the biggest mistake for him not to start speaking with the Taliban in 2002. **Reconciliation in the initial stage of peacebuilding, when former enemies are marginalized, would be a key lesson for future peacebuilding.**

(2) Massive economic and social projects to improve living conditions in the first 6 months

There is a unified voice on how critical it is to improve living conditions in the first 6 months after peacebuilding starts. But the international community tends to focus on political dimensions and forget about the importance of economic and social improvements in the initial stage, which may be critical for constructing domestic legitimacy.

(3) Creating a much simpler electoral system

The members of the Afghan constitutional committee did not seriously consider the complexity of Afghan elections (presidential elections, Lower House elections, Upper House elections that involve district and provincial council elections). The members thought that the more elections they had, the more legitimacy the Afghan government would have. One draft of the constitution had no Upper House election; that could have been much better in simplifying elections and legislative processes.

(4) Role of the UN: UN Peacekeepers in Afghanistan?

It was not seriously discussed before, and is not realistic in this current operation. But theoretically, it was possible for UN peacekeepers to play a role in maintaining security in Afghanistan. The

opposing argument is that NATO and Western countries never want the UN to play a commanding role in their forces in such combat zones because of UN mistakes in Somalia and Bosnia. The supporting argument is that the UN has more legitimacy in terms of acceptance from local populace. According to my opinion survey, **70% in Kandahar and more than 95% in Wardak and Kapisa think that the UN should play a central role in commanding international forces.** It is also much easier for the UN to coordinate military operations and political programs, such as reconciliation and disarmament.

The role of the UN in commanding international forces should be an important discussion for future peacebuilding activities in the world, but may be not realistic for Afghanistan any time soon. However, at least UNAMA should be mandated to play a substantial role in coordinating military operations and political programs.

Conclusion

Two general conclusions can be drawn from the research with regard to enhancing the legitimacy of domestic government in the process of peacebuilding.

(1) Political processes and programs need to be monitored, implemented, and even supervised by international organizations, especially by the UN; depending on local ownership without sufficient supervision is often counter-effective **with regard to political programs.** It is not because of the lack of capabilities of local people, but because of the nature of post-conflict nation building: A credible third party needs to play a role in ensuring an impartial peace process and guaranteeing that the political rights of various factions are protected when they comply with elections or disarmament.

It is notable that the UN has very high trust and credibility in Afghanistan. According to my own opinion poll, **80% of People surveyed in Kandahar, 95 % in Wardak, and 99% in Kapisa perceive that the UN is more credible than individual states in creating good government in Afghanistan.** This credibility of the UN might enable the UN to play a crucial role in political programs, such as disarmament and reconciliation.

(2) Economic projects must be seen as government programs as much as possible. In other words, economic and social improvements should be seen as results of government efforts so that the improvements increase the legitimacy of the domestic government. In initial stage of peacebuilding, though, it may be recommended for international actors to have more direct investments to make quick impacts on improving the living conditions of people, but it is important to make a smooth transit to the assistance projects that respect more local ownership. In return, the international actors should be allowed to monitor government projects and address the concern of corruption.

Chapter 1: How to Assess Legitimacy Construction in Peacebuilding

What is Legitimacy? Its Application to Peacebuilding

The question for my research is “in the process of peacebuilding, how peacebuilders—both domestic and international peacebuilders—can construct ‘legitimate governments’ in which people comply with rules of newly created governments in a voluntary mode.” To clarify the definition of “legitimate government,” though, it is indispensable to identify what legitimacy is.

“Legitimacy” seems to have a shared definition by a majority of International Relations theorists. Hurd states that “legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”³ Frank argues that **“legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or of the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority.** It exerts a claim to compliance in the voluntarist mode.”⁴ The common feature of these definitions suggests that legitimacy essentially contains psychological elements, in which different actors judge whether or not rules and the rule-making institutions are fundamentally “right” so that they want to comply with them even in a voluntary mode.

The definition of legitimacy, in turn, indicates key features of the “legitimate government.” Reus-Smit presents the definition of “being legitimate”: “when legitimacy is ascribed to an actor or institutions, we describe it as *legitimate*.”⁵ Thus, **“legitimate government” can be defined as a government under which people tend to comply with the rules of government, not because of the coercive powers of the government, nor because of personal calculation of short-term interests, but because of their conviction that the compliance is right.**

I agree with Hurd that legitimacy is not necessarily indispensable for governments to create social control; it may be possible for some governments to establish social control by only coercion or sanction to coerce people to follow their rules. But without legitimacy, “coercion and sanction are costly mechanisms of control” because the controllers would need to deploy police and forces on every street corner.⁶ Thus, **legitimacy is critical to pull compliance and achieve social control with substantially lower costs for controllers.**⁷

Those definitions and understanding of legitimacy clarify the question of my research: it is about the mechanisms of creating legitimate governments in the process of peacebuilding, especially when the international community—the UN, regional organizations, NGOs, and foreign states— is deeply involved in creating new governments in these war-torn states.

³ Hurd 1999, 381.

⁴ Frank 1990, 26.

⁵ Reus-Smit 2007, 159.

⁶ Hurd 1999, 385.

⁷ Migdal (1988, 32-33), also emphasizing that legitimacy is the most potent factor for states to exercise social control, argues that “state leaders want citizens to comply with its authority not from the inertia of unreasoning routines or the utilitarian calculation of personal advantage, but from the conviction that compliance is right.”

The creation of “legitimate government” by the involvement—or intervention—of international actors in war-torn states faces enormous challenges. On the one hand, domestic peacebuilders suffer from widely prevailing hatred and hostility from different domestic groups and actors who fought war. On the other hand, international peacebuilders face the risk that their intervention can be perceived as quasi-colonial actions. Thus, both newly created governments and international actors face severe challenges and difficulties to obtain domestic legitimacy in the eyes of local people; this research is an attempt to address this critical question.

What are Critical Factors in Constructing Legitimacy? Five Key Hypothetical Factors

In order to create a hypothesis about how the domestic legitimacy can be constructed in the peacebuilding process, I have conducted numerous interviews with practitioners, such as UN officials and government officials who are deeply involved in peacebuilding around the world, as well as domestic peacebuilders (mainly government officials) working in war-torn states since 2006.⁸

As a consequence, I hypothesize that **there are five key factors that might have a substantial impact on determining compliance or noncompliance with critical political developments in peacebuilding, such as results of elections, creation of new constitutions, and disarmament of local military factions. And repeated compliance with these key political programs can create legitimate governments in the long run. On the other hand, if people continue to decide on noncompliance with those political developments, the legitimacy of the government will be eroded.**

Graph in Appendix 2 shows these five hypothetical factors and how they could be linked with compliance and noncompliance and then the creation or erosion of domestic legitimacy.

The policies regarding these five factors can be influenced, although not perfectly controlled, by international actors (international peacebuilders) who engage in peacebuilding: In this sense, the policies regarding these factors can be considered “policy inputs” that can largely be influenced by international actors.

(1) Role of the UN

There are clear-cut differences in the roles of the UN in the current peacebuilding efforts. For example, the UN has had only a “marginal role” in Iraq, especially in the first year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.⁹ In Afghanistan, the role of the UN mission since the U.S. attack against

⁸ Those officials include the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, the former Under Secretary-General for political affairs in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), directors of the policy planning unit in DPA, acting director of the best practice unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and numerous officials in charge of each peacebuilding operation at both DPA and DPKO, as well as officials in the Peacebuilding Support Office. Ogata Sadako, the president of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and JICA officials in charge of peacebuilding activities in the world also continue to give me opportunities to interview those officials. I also had many meetings with Canadian government officials and scholars who are deeply involved in peacebuilding activities.

⁹ Author’s interview with Prendergast, the former Under Secretary-General on Political Affairs (Chief of the Department of Political Affairs in the UN Secretary) on 26 May 2006. Diamond (2004, 46), a senior advisor to the

the Taliban government has been only to assist the political aspects of Afghan peacebuilding; the UN basically has not played any role in commanding international military operations—both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by NATO as well as the military operations called “Operation Enduring Freedom” are commanded by the United States.¹⁰

In contrast, the UN mission had full authority in East Timor during the first three years’ transitional period since 1999, and in numerous UN peacebuilding missions in Africa, such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sierra Leone. In these peacebuilding operations, the UN missions commanded both international military and civilian operations under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The UN international civilian police have virtually assumed “full responsibility for law enforcement.”¹¹

The question is whether these differences in the roles of the UN would make a substantial difference in pulling compliance from local populace and leaders and then creating legitimate governments, and how.

(2) Inclusiveness of new domestic governments

In every peacebuilding operation, the degree to which the different local groups should be included in the political process—in other words, how broadly the different factions should participate in creating new governments—is one of the most difficult decisions for peacebuilders; many international officials who experienced peacebuilding share the view that this inclusiveness is critical for establishing new legitimate governments.

While the UN officials tend to assume that broader inclusiveness is better, there are notable arguments that assert some types of spoilers should be excluded and militarily defeated. For example, Stedman argues that “total spoilers” never change their goals, so they should be defeated, while the “limited spoilers” or “greedy spoilers” should be included in the peace process as those spoilers can change their interests and goals by having their demands met—mainly economic need.¹²

In sum, whether, how, and under what conditions different political factions—including possible insurgent groups—should be included to create legitimate governments in the process of peacebuilding are the key questions for this research.

(3) Local ownership

This is the factor that many international officials who engage in peacebuilding use to answer the question of creating legitimacy in the eyes of local people: making local people feel that they are the main actors. As we will see in Afghan cases, those claims are also largely shared by domestic peacebuilders.

Coalition Provisional Authority led by Bremer, also argues, “Washington – and Bremer in Baghdad – proved unwilling to surrender any significant measure of control to the UN.”

¹⁰ Paris 2004, 226. & UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, regarding the authorization of ISAF by the UN Security Council.

¹¹ Caplan 2005, 46.

¹² Stedman 1997.

On the other hand, there is a shared perception by international donors that giving full local ownership has potential risk to create corrupt governments, especially in war-torn states.¹³ In many cases, new governments in war-torn states also do not have capacity to implement projects due to lack of resource and political wills.

Whether or not local ownership really matters in creating compliance with both economic and political programs, and in what timing, are important questions for this research.

(4) Resource distribution (the government's provision of basic services)

There seems to be a shared understanding by many practitioners as well as scholars that it is critical for peacebuilders to achieve efficient resource distribution or the provision of government services with regard to improving people's daily living conditions (such as water, electricity, and medical service) in creating legitimacy. Salvatore Lombardo, the representative of UNHCR in Afghanistan, explicitly asserts, "**Legitimacy comes from electricity, not from only elections in this fragile state.**"¹⁴ This view is also shared by many top government officials in charge of peacebuilding.¹⁵

One important examination for this "resource distribution" is there might be a "trade-off" between international peacebuilders and domestic peacebuilders in terms of the impact of resource distribution on the local people's perception of the peacebuilders; for example, if local people perceive that all economic projects are conducted by international actors, it might harm their support for new domestic governments.

Thus, it may require the international peacebuilders to exercise careful management to increase the legitimacy of domestic government while simultaneously improving socioeconomic conditions for local people. That would raise substantial challenges for peacebuilders as these fragile states sometimes might not have a functioning state bureaucracy to implement economic projects.¹⁶

(5) Ways (or procedures) of using force

The question about when the use of force by both domestic and international peacebuilders is seen as acceptable or legitimate in the eyes of local people has been a significant puzzle.

Democracy theorists argue that what is crucial for democratic states in the use of force is that "they

¹³ Helleiner presents the view of aid donors that aid donors can "rationalize their high degree of intrusion and conditionality" by pointing to "government ineffectiveness or corruption." (Helleiner 2002, 82)

¹⁴ Author's interview with Salvatore Lombardo, Representative of UNHCR in Afghanistan on 20 February 2008.

¹⁵ For example, both Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Popal, the director of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance in Afghanistan, unanimously emphasize the criticality of improving living conditions of people to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government (Author's interview with Minister Zia on 31 May 2008 and with Director Popal on 4 June 2008).

¹⁶ These concepts of "resource distribution" as well as "local ownership" and "inclusiveness" are perfectly matched with theoretical arguments about the source of legitimacy. Keohane (2006, 3) argues that there are two sources of legitimacy: one is output legitimacy that refers to the "achievement of the substantive purposes of the organization, such as security and welfare"; the second is "input legitimacy" that "refers to the processes by which decisions are reached." And "resource distribution" here can be categorized as "output legitimacy," while "inclusiveness" and "local ownership" can be categorized as "input legitimacy."

are constitutional and operate under the *rule of law*.¹⁷ The emphasis on the rule of law that is knowable and fair to all people—thus, not arbitrary—is very insightful in examining the use of force by international actors in peacebuilding.

Of course, the challenge is that in war-torn states, the rule of law in the use of force might not be established yet; thus, it is not an easy task for international actors to make legal rules for the use of force and make them knowable to everybody. What kinds of legal rules and procedures should be established in terms of the use of force in enhancing domestic legitimacy is one of the important questions.¹⁸

What Are Processes to Establish Legitimate Governments or Erode Them?

My field research aims to examine what kind of policies in these five hypothetical factors are effective in creating compliance with key political developments and establishing legitimate domestic governments in the specific context of each peacebuilding. In other words, the research will try to find the possible linkages between these five factors and compliance/noncompliance with key political developments, such as conducting elections, creating new constitutions, and disarming armed groups (warlords).

In order to elucidate these linkages, the research will investigate not only whether policies regarding these factors affect compliance/noncompliance, but also why and how these policies induce the compliance/noncompliance behaviors.

As I explained, Hurd argues that there are three mechanisms for compliance: (1) coercion, (2) self-interest calculation, and (3) legitimacy. However, I assert that Hurd's explanation about compliance based on "self-interest calculation" is missing one important component in the mechanism of compliance, especially when we focus on the building of democratic states.¹⁹ It is the factor provided by Przeworski, a prominent democracy scholar, who suggests that **"democratic institutions must be fair and impartial"** when people accept the results of elections repeatedly.²⁰

It is plausible that if political factions who lost elections fear that their political rights might be destroyed or their members put in jail by the new government, it will be difficult for them to accept the results of lost elections. It must be the same for compliance with disarmament by local factions.

¹⁷ Warren 2007, 387. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸ Morphet (2002), for example, argues that transitional civil administrations are more likely to achieve political legitimacy, nationally and internationally, if the states involved base their peacebuilding work on international legal standards and norms, as seen in East Timor.

¹⁹ An important caveat for this research is that **I assume that international peacebuilders assist the creation of "democratic governments" in the process of peacebuilding**. While there might be an argument that the democratic system is not a good system to establish order in war-torn states, it is difficult to imagine, at least any time soon, that international actors such as foreign states or international organizations will substantially assist the creation of new totalitarian or authoritarian regimes **as an ultimate goal of peacebuilding** efforts. Those efforts seem to be difficult to obtain "international legitimacy" in the eyes of the international community. If peacebuilding with the ultimate goal of creating authoritarian or totalitarian regimes become prominent, we need to make different analysis on how those efforts can be possible.

²⁰ Przeworski 1991, 33.

Thus, **the sense of “impartiality” may be critical in assuring both their chance of winning elections in the next elections, as well as protecting their political rights** even if they lose elections. **This credibility of a third party might be also critical in conducting disarmament against military factions** because they cannot disarm themselves until they can perceive that their political rights will be protected after the disarmament.²¹

I hypothesize that this sense of “impartiality” would be something that “international” peacebuilders can bring to the process of peacebuilding. In war-torn states, it is extremely difficult for domestic institutions to give a sense of “impartiality” because they also fought with other factions. Thus, **the international actors may bring credibility as impartial peacebuilders in the eyes of local parties and people**, and this credibility would be the key basis for even interest-driven compliance.

In short, there would be two routes from the five factors to compliance/noncompliance behaviors: one is the “direct effect” of the policies regarding these key five factors on the compliance/noncompliance behaviors; the second is the “indirect effect” of the factors on “the creation of a sense of credibility as impartial,” and this credibility/incredibility would influence compliance/noncompliance behaviors with key political developments. (Of course, it needs to be examined by field research whether that is the case.)

It is important to recognize that it would be almost impossible to create legitimate domestic governments *in a very short time frame*; **only repeated compliance with key political developments**, such as accepting the results of elections, the contents of constitutions, and disarming military factions, **can establish legitimate domestic government**.

The reason is that the more compliance actors comply with key political procedures, the more their governments become legitimate in the eyes of local people in the long run, as governments’ rules are internalized in their social or even psychological conditions, and “democracy becomes the only game in town.”²² Different theoretical findings also indicate that domestic legitimate government can be established only by the repeated compliance with key political procedures.²³

On the other hand, **repeated noncompliance with key political events by using violent methods would erode domestic legitimacy, collapse new governments, and cause relapse into conflict**.

In this process of “repeated compliance/noncompliance,” I hypothesize that **the change of interests or identities of local factions (socialization) are important in enhancing the repeated compliance**. For example, some military factions might change their interests (e.g., from the expansion of territorial occupation to the improvement of their popularity for election) or their identities (e.g., from military factions to political parties), and these changes of interests and identities can drastically enhance the chance of repeated compliance.²⁴

²¹ Carolyn McAskie, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, emphasized the importance of this credibility, which can be injected by the UN presence as a credible third party (Author’s interview with Carolyn McAskie on 4 June 2007).

²² Linz & Stephan 1996, 5.

²³ Rues-Smit (2007) emphasizes the importance of recurring compliance to strengthen legitimacy, while Przeworski (1991, 26) also points out that repeated compliance makes democracy the only game in town.

²⁴ For example, examining the peacebuilding in El Salvador, MacLeod (2006, 36) argues that the FMLN, the previous communist

What Should Be Investigated?

The linkages explained above are hypotheses; thus, without investigation with detailed field research, we are not sure about whether these linkages occur or not, and how. In order to examine these linkages and try to find effective policies on these five factors, this research takes three main steps.

(1) Identifying Current Policies on Five Key Factors

I will research what kinds of policies have been implemented, mainly regarding the five key factors, such as the role of the UN, inclusiveness, local ownership, resource distribution, and use of force in each peacebuilding. I will also investigate the aims of peacebuilders on these policies, as well as the outcomes of these policies.

(2) Examining Impact of Policies on Compliance and Noncompliance

After identifying the key policies, I will gather data on behaviors of local factions in compliance and noncompliance with key political developments, such as “compliance rate by commanders” on disarmament or “military attack against governments.” The compliance with the constitution may be measured by the number of insurgency attacks because no constitution allows military factions to conduct military attacks on the government or international peacebuilders.

After I obtain data for compliance or noncompliance, I will investigate the “motives” of actors in determining compliance or noncompliance. In this context, understanding the perception of ordinary people is critical as the people’s perception toward peacebuilders (including domestic governments) must have crucial impact on the behaviors of political and military actors.

(3) Recommendations

From these analyses, I make recommendations in each case about effective policies that would enhance the establishment of “domestic legitimacy” in the peacebuilding process. The recommendations deal with both ongoing situations and past activities; lessons from the past should be also important for future peacebuilding activities in the world.

Examining Afghan Peacebuilding

With regard to investigating the challenges of Afghan legitimacy construction, I conducted field research in February 2008 (2 weeks) and May & June (6 weeks) in Afghanistan based on my hypothesis. In order to understand the policies in five key factors and key political developments, I accessed both domestic and international policy makers and leaders.

As for the **domestic leaders**, I interviewed Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance; Ehsan Zia,

guerrilla group, “came to identify itself first and foremost as a democratic politically party...this new identity became possible only when gradual implementation of the peace accords...changed the relevant political calculus.”

the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD); Ismail Khan, the Minister of Energy (and famous former commander); Jelani Popal, the Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), as well as Masoom Stanekzai, Adviser to President and Vice Chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D & R Commission), which is in charge of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG); Aziz Ahmadzai, the Acting Director of DIAG; Najibullah Mojadidi, the Acting Director of PTS (National Reconciliation Program); and numerous government officials. As for the **international leaders**, I interviewed Christopher Alexander, Deputy SRSG of UNAMA; Anita Nirody, the Country Director of UNDP; Salvatore Lombardo, the Representative of UNHCR; Richard Corsino, the Country Director of WFP; Maurits Jochems, the Ambassador & NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan; and numerous UN political officers.

But those interviews above are to capture the policies and the aims of peacebuilders. In order to examine how local people and local stakeholders perceive the policies of the peacebuilders and decide the compliance or noncompliance behaviors with key political and economic programs, it is indispensable for the research to understand the perception and behaviors of both local people and political stakeholders.

And to make comparative analysis on compliance and noncompliance behaviors, I decided to focus on three regions: **Kapisa Province** (especially Kohistan 1 District and Koh Band District), which has a high rate of compliance with the disarmament program (DIAG), lower numbers of attacks against the government, and Tajik-dominated areas; **Wardak Province** (especially in Jalrez District and Maydan Shahr District), which has a low rate of compliance with DIAG, higher numbers of attacks against the government, and Pashtun-dominated areas; and **Kandahar Province**, which is one of the regions in which the government cannot even start implementing DIAG due to insecurity, very high rate of attacks against the government, and Pashtun-dominated areas. I interviewed over **40 local political stakeholders in Kandahar, Wardak, and Kapisa**, such as commanders who face the critical decisions of their disarmaments, regional officers in charge of reconciliation program (PTS), Provincial Governors, members of Provincial Councils in different regions, District Governors, tribe leaders, and leaders of Community Development Councils (CDC).

In addition to these individual interviews with local stakeholders, I also conducted an **opinion survey of 260 people** in Kandahar (50), Wardak (102), and Kapisa (108) to understand their perception of the policies and credibility of the government and international actors. The questions include their perception of disarmament, reconciliation, and the economic and social situation. **The results of the opinion survey are shown in Appendix 1.**

How General Are the Research Findings?

It may be a philosophical question whether there is a unified answer about effective policies in these hypothetical factions for creating legitimate governments in war-torn states across cases. But I do believe that **accumulated understanding of possible effective policies in different peacebuilding cases can give us important lessons and implications on how peacebuilders should deal with both ongoing and future peacebuilding efforts.**

It may be the same for research about airplane accidents. You might not be able to find a law-like general theory to account for all airplane accidents across regions and times, but we still need to make precise investigations about the causality of each accident and recommendations on how to reduce airplane accidents in the future.

Chapter 2: Why Comply or Not Comply? Analysis of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

Background: DDR and DIAG in Afghanistan

The disarmament program in Afghanistan started at a relatively early stage of Afghan peacebuilding. In February 2003, one year and two months after the Bohn Conference (which decided a major course of peacebuilding in Afghanistan), the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process was initiated. The DDR in Afghanistan mainly targeted former soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (that were state military forces before the Taliban regime). DDR supported the disarmament and integration of 63,380 former soldiers; and 55,804 soldiers chose one of the reintegration options: obtaining vocational training, small business opportunities, government jobs, etc.²⁵

As the DDR in Afghanistan targeted the former soldiers of the Afghan national army, there was shared recognition that the next disarmament program should be initiated to disarm numerous illegal armed groups (warlords who possess military powers in local areas) to establish security orders governed by the central government. Thus, in 2005, the program called DIAG (the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) was launched, aiming for “improving human security through disbandment of illegal armed groups and reducing the level of violence in the community.”²⁶

DIAG first identified about 1700 illegal armed groups (IAG) in the entire country and started disbanding those groups by collecting weapons from them. Due to security reasons, DIAG was mainly launched in the Eastern, Central, and Northern regions in Afghanistan. DIAG is monitored and supervised by the Joint Secretariat composed of major domestic institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D & R Commission), as well as international actors, such as the International Security Forces (ISAF), UNAMA, and Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP). The Joint Secretariat identified targeted districts from each province, and the DIAG committee in each province started persuading commanders identified as leaders of illegal armed groups to surrender weapons.

As Aziz Ahmadzai, the acting director of DIAG (No. 2 Afghan official in charge of DIAG), asserts, the DIAG is “a central pillar of entire security reform in Afghanistan.”²⁷ Without DIAG, it is difficult for the central government to establish functioning police and armies that can effectively provide people with security because “without disbanding illegal armed groups, these groups can switch their sides and become insurgents at any moment.”²⁸

At the same time, DIAG also aims to create trust between people and the government. Masoom

²⁵ Fact Sheet: Provided by Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme by UNDP and UNAMA. Accessed at <http://www.undpanbp.org/Overview/factsheet.htm>

²⁶ Afghanistan New Beginning Program: Project Statement. Accessed at http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/psl/prj_anbp.htm

²⁷ Author’s interview with Aziz Ahmadzai, acting director of DIAG, on 25 May 2008.

²⁸ Ibid.

Stanekzai, the Vice Chairman of D & R Commission (the Chairman of the D & R Commission is the vice president; thus, Stanekzai is virtually the No. 1 Afghan official who is specifically responsible for DIAG), asserts that “because there is substantial suspicion among people and tribes toward the government with regard to security, it is critical to create trust through implementing DIAG.”²⁹

A major component of DIAG in creating trust between people and the government is **the promise of DIAG to provide development projects to the districts where more than 75% of targeted weapons are collected.** In other words, if more than 75% of weapons that are identified as possessed by illegal armed groups in a district are surrendered to the government by commanders, DIAG will implement development projects in those districts.

This mechanism has two major objectives: one is to give commanders an incentive to surrender their weapons to the government; the second is to create trust between people and the government by “improving both socio-economic and security conditions.”³⁰

The achievement of DIAG is not small. As of 31 August 2008, DIAG has succeeded in collecting 41,183 weapons and 30,466 ammunitions. **Among 1700 identified illegal armed groups, 363 illegal armed groups have already disbanded.** Considering the current security situation in Afghanistan, David Wilson, the head of the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP), which is an international counterpart to the D & R Commission in implementing DIAG, claimed that “disbanding more than 300 illegal armed groups is not a bad result at all.”³¹

At the same time, DIAG faces enormous challenges. The deteriorating security and the Taliban’s regaining powers in Afghanistan make DIAG implementation more difficult. The number of weapons possessed by Afghan people seems also huge: It is estimated that there are from 1 million to 20 million weapons in Afghanistan, and if it is 5 million, “it would take 100 years to collect all weapons in Afghanistan.”³²

But I argue that it is important to keep DIAG operational so that DIAG can give people perspectives that even commanders are cooperating with the government so that they would gain more security provided by the government in the future; people can also experience development projects as a result of the compliance of commanders with DIAG. In other words, **DIAG is critical in giving people “the confidence in government’s ability to provide security and development.”**³³

And it is noteworthy that an overwhelming majority of Afghan people support DIAG. **According to my own opinion survey, 97% of people surveyed in Kapisa Province, 100% of Wardak Province, and 78% of Kandahar Province answered that commanders should surrender their weapons** (Appendix 1, Q. 23). The major reason is that people want to have development projects as a result of surrendering weapons; at the same time, many people also believe that if commanders surrender weapons, the government police will start functioning and providing them with more security. One villager living in Wardak Province responded to me that “if commanders surrender

²⁹ Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai, the Vice Chairman of the D & R Commission, on 18 February 2008.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Author’s interview with David Wilson, the head of the Afghan New Beginning Program, on 18 February 2008.

³² Comment by international officials covering DIAG with a condition of anonymity in 2008.

³³ Author’s interview with Stanekzai on 18 February 2008.

weapons, the government police will function and start giving us the security in our community, even though there is no functioning police now.”³⁴ There were many voices who expected the future improvement of security if DIAG is completed in their regions.

Due to all the reasons above, there is significant importance to implementing DIAG. In the following sections, I will analyze “reasons for compliance” by examining the case of Kapisa Province, “reasons for noncompliance” by examining the case of Jalrez District in Wardak Province, “the problem of DIAG development projects,” and “recommendations” for future DIAG.

Reasons for Compliance: Examining DIAG in Kapisa Province

In order to examine motives for compliance and noncompliance behaviors with DIAG, I interviewed 10 commanders who faced the request by DIAG to surrender weapons and complied or did not comply with the DIAG program. As for a case where commanders complied with DIAG, I focused on two districts in Kapisa Province: Kohistan 1 District and Koh Band District. Both districts have already reached the DIAG compliance rate, which means that more than 75% of targeted weapons have already been surrendered to the government.

(1) Economic Incentive for Their Communities

There is no doubt that one of the most important reasons for complying with DIAG is the economic incentive that DIAG provides. According to the DIAG program, **commanders who surrender weapons are not going to obtain any money or projects in return for their weapons, but the districts they live in will gain economic development projects** (DIAG development projects). This mechanism becomes a big incentive for commanders to surrender weapons.

For example, Hassam-u-din, a commander in Koh Band District who commanded more than 300 people during the war against the Taliban, surrendered about 600 weapons to the DIAG program. He explained the reasons: “First of all, we are already tired of wars. Second, **I realized that if we surrendered weapons, our people in our district would obtain important development projects. As my main concern is always my people, I judged that it was better to comply with DIAG.**”³⁵ The other four commanders who complied with DIAG in Kapisa unanimously responded to me that their first reason for the compliance was that they thought it was good to obtain development projects in their districts, even if they would not directly obtain benefits or money.

In this sense, the strategy by top officials in charge of DIAG was successful. Stanekzai argues that because the collection of weapons by DIAG was not so encouraging in 2006, DIAG changed its implementation strategy: When the DIAG Joint Secretariat identify districts for DIAG implementation, **the DIAG officials start discussion with local people to identify possible development projects by DIAG even before 75% of targeted weapons are surrendered.**

³⁴ Author’s interview with a villager in Wardak during the opinion survey in Wardak on 16 June 2008. Every interview with villagers during the opinion survey was conducted with a condition of anonymity due to security reasons.

³⁵ Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din, a former commander for the Northern Alliance in Koh Band District in Kapisa Province on 22 June 2008.

Stanekzai asserts, “By starting the discussion with local people about the potential development projects even before commanders surrender weapons, those discussions themselves become big pressure for commanders to surrender weapons.”³⁶ After starting this practice, DIAG gained momentum and compliance with DIAG drastically speeded up.³⁷ The interviews with many commanders seem to prove the effectiveness of this strategy.

(2) Initiation of “Socialization” (Change of Interest and Identities)

When commanders surrender weapons, they are doing so for not only altruistic reasons; **commanders believe that compliance with DIAG is one of the important steps to change their identities from military commanders to political leaders.** All five commanders who complied with DIAG and responded to my interviews in Kapisa expressed their ambitions to become candidates for the Provincial Councils or even Parliament in the next election. Raees Arab Shah, who commanded 600 soldiers during the war against the Taliban, explained, “I heard numerous expectations from many people in my regions that they want me to become a candidate for next provincial council or parliament election... And my cooperation with DIAG is one of the important reasons why people supported me and appreciated me.”³⁸ Hassam-u-din also was frank about this point: “My people want to be a candidate for provincial council member in the next election, thus I will run for it... And my people are very happy about my cooperation with DIAG.”³⁹

Thus, as my hypothesis predicted, socialization, that is, the change of interests and identities of political actors, seems to play important roles in this compliance mechanism. And if these commanders succeed in changing their identities, it would enhance the future compliance with different political events, such as elections, then strengthen the legitimacy of the government. **Unfortunately, however, the slow implementation of DIAG development projects has become a big impediment to this socialization,** as will be explained in following sections (In Koh Band District, for example, the development projects have not been implemented for more than one year after the compliance rate reached 75%, and those commanders who cooperated with DIAG lost confidence and trust in DIAG.).

(3) Credibility of the UN

The commanders who complied with DIAG also unanimously expressed that one of the main reasons why they trusted the promise of the government is **the involvement of the United Nations.** In the DIAG implementation process, the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP), which is supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is collaborating with the DIAG committee in each province, led by the provincial governors, and persuading commanders to surrender weapons. The UNAMA staff also committed to monitor the DIAG process in many parts of Afghanistan. And **the involvement of the UN agencies appears to play a critical role in giving commanders trust in the promise of the government.**

³⁶ Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai on 18 February 2008.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Author’s interview with Raees Arab Shah, a commander in Koh Band District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008.

³⁹ Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008.

The commander Hassam-u-din was explicit on this point: “If only government officials had come to me and persuaded me to surrender weapons, I would never have complied with those requests, because I cannot trust the current government. Because the UN staff came to us and promised that we would obtain development projects for our district if we surrendered weapons, we decided to surrender weapons to DIAG.”⁴⁰ Another commander in Kohistan 1 District, Meraj-u-din, also asserted that “I decided to surrender weapons because I thought our district could gain economic projects in the future; and because it was the UN staff who came to me, I trusted their words.”⁴¹ Five commanders who responded to my interviews in Kapisa unanimously argued that part of the reasons why they trusted the government promise on development projects was they were persuaded by the UN staff, who they thought would be more credible than the government officials.

Why did they think the UN staff (including Afghan staff) is more credible? Hassam-u-din argues that he and other commanders watched the work of several UN agencies—mainly work by Afghan UN staff—and they thought the UN is making serious efforts to solve their regional problems.⁴² This perspective was shared by other commanders, such as Raees Arab Shah and Abdul Fath Shafiq, the commanders in Kapisa Province. .

Those views about the credibility of the UN are shared by local ordinary people: **In Kapisa Province, 99% of people responded that the UN is more credible than other foreign states** (Appendix 1, Q. 14). With regard to the reasons for this credibility, 74% of people answered “because the UN personnel are from many different regions in the world,” 63% of people answered “because the UN is established by the resolution of the UN Security Council,” and 63% of people answered “because the UN is neutral to every faction.” (It is important to recognize that 70% of all Afghans are said to be listening to BBC radio (or TV) every day for their information; their political awareness is very high, even if about 60% of Afghans are illiterate, according to the Ministry of Education.)

It seems certain that this role of the UN, as a credible peacebuilders or a third party, plays a key role in giving military and political leaders the motivation to comply with crucial political programs such as DIAG. This credibility is precious and needs to be maintained.

(4) Other Factors

If the economic incentive (resource distribution), the role of the UN, and socialization (change of identities and interests) are major factors contributing to compliance, how do other factors such as inclusiveness, local ownership, and the use of force function in this mechanism?

With regard to inclusiveness, it is true that Kohistan 1 and Koh Band Districts are Tajik-dominated areas and commanders tend to be sympathetic to the current government, as these commanders fought against the Taliban as part of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. Abdul Fatah Shafiq, the district governor in Kohistan 1, said that “Kohistan 1 and Koh Band were a focal point for Tajik

⁴⁰ Author’s interview with Hassm-u-din on 22 June 2008.

⁴¹ Author’s interview with Meraj-u-din, the commander in Kohistan 1 District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008.

⁴² Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008.

people to fight against the Taliban.”⁴³

However, this ethnic sympathy seem less related to the compliance with DIAG, as many other districts where Pashtun people dominate also reached 75% compliance; for example, Maydan Shahr District in Wardak Province is a highly Pashtun-dominated district and was controlled by the Taliban during the Taliban regime, but it reached 75% compliance in early 2008. Three commanders who live in Maydan Shahr District and complied with DIAG by surrendering weapons—Haji Abdul Qadim, Gul Rahman, and Aziz Ullah—asserted that they decided to surrender weapons because DIAG potential development projects must be beneficial for their districts and themselves as well.⁴⁴

In that sense, **inclusiveness, or reconciliation, seems more directly linked with security situations, and security situations have a critical impact on the compliance with DIAG.** If commanders feel physical threats from other insurgency or other military groups—including the Taliban—it is difficult for commanders to surrender weapons. And Kohistan 1 and Koh Band are one of the safest and secured districts in the central region of Afghanistan.

In 2006, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, collaborating with UNHCR, conducted more than 8000 interviews with local people and issued a comprehensive report on “Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan.”⁴⁵ Because of special cooperation by the Commission for this research project, I obtained the data in key districts for my analysis, such as Kandahar City, Kohistan 1, Koh Band, and Jalrez in Wardak Province (which I will examine in the section on “reasons for noncompliance”). According to this data, 62 persons responded to the survey in Kohistan 1 and 32 persons responded in Koh Band, and there were only 2 killings that occurred to interviewees or their families during the past 12 months in 2006. (This has a sharp contrast with Jalrez District, which had 10 interviewees whose families were killed during the last 12 months among 58 interviewees.)

In my opinion survey, **86% of people in Kohistan 1 and Koh Band think that their daily life has become safer than their life under the Taliban government,** which has again a sharp contrast with Wardak Province, where 64% of people think that their daily life has become more dangerous than their life under the Taliban government (Appendix 1, Q. 22). In these dangerous regions, the insecurity prevents commanders from surrendering weapons because they feel physical threats.

In short, inclusiveness, or reconciliation, have critical impact on security situation (as we will examine in the next chapter), then security conditions greatly influence the compliance with the disarmament program.

In terms of **local ownership**, as Stanekzai insisted, it seems necessary for local authorities to lead the process “to avoid the suspicion that DIAG is imposed by outsiders.”⁴⁶ But as many commanders claim, they decided to comply with DIAG substantially because the UN is involved and they trusted the UN. In this sense, the UN needs to be responsible for not only monitoring but also supervising

⁴³ Author’s interview with Abdul Fatah Shafiq, district governor in Kohistan 1 District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008.

⁴⁴ Author’s interview with Haji Abdul Qadim, Gul Rahman, and Aziz Ullah on 15 June 2008.

⁴⁵ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan May 2006.”

⁴⁶ Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai on 18 February 2008.

the whole process of implementing DIAG—if necessary—to keep the trust of local commanders. As I will examine in more detail in the section on the problem of DIAG development projects, it is sometimes dangerous for the UN and other international actors to use “local ownership” and avoid responsibility, when their involvement is indispensable to induce compliance.

As for **the use of force**, commanders in Kohistan 1 and Koh Band assert that “they never comply with surrendering weapons by coercion of the government because the government is relatively weak.”⁴⁷ Their claims seem plausible because even though the police in Kohistan 1 and Koh Band have relatively high standards, the number of police and military soldiers deployed in Kohistan 1 is 78 and in Koh Band is 93, while big commanders such as Raees Arab Shah or Hassam-u-din still obtain powers to influence (or command) 300 to 600 former subordinates. In that sense, **the coercion by the government seems to play a relatively marginal role in the compliance with DIAG.**

In short, research in Kohistan 1 and Koh Band Districts suggests that the key mechanisms for complying with DIAG are (1) economic incentives, (2) socialization (identity shift from military leaders to political leaders), and (3) the credibility of the UN. Inclusiveness and reconciliation seem to play key roles in determining security situations that also have big impacts on the compliance with DIAG.

Reasons for Noncompliance: Examining Jalrez District in Wardak Province

Jalrez District is located in the valley in Wardak Province, which is next to Kabul Province. Now the UN officials have no access to Jalrez due to insecurity. In order to interview commanders and people from Jalrez District, I needed to ask people and commanders to come to the provincial center of Wardak Province, which the UN still had access to in June, 2008.

As of 31 August 2008, the DIAG Joint Secretariat identifies that no weapons from Jalrez have been handed over to the DIAG program; there is no compliance with DIAG. Jalrez is one of the few districts that the DIAG Joint Secretariat has targeted for DIAG, but no weapons have been counted.

(1) Losing Credibility of the DIAG

It is ironic that commanders in Jalrez made substantial cooperation with DDR by handing over hundreds of weapons in 2004 and 2005, but when commanders in Jalrez surrendered weapons in 2005 to the government authority, those weapons were not counted as DIAG hand-overs, though these commanders believed that their weapons would be counted for DIAG. The reason is that those weapons in Jalrez were handed over to the government just one month before DIAG was formally launched in 2005. And this missed calculation or missed coordination created a huge mistrust in the government and deprived the commanders of the motives to cooperate with DIAG.

Haji Mohammad Hazrat Janan, the Chief of Provincial Council in Wardak Province, lives in Jalrez and committed himself to persuade commanders to surrender weapons in the whole DIAG process in Jalrez. Janan asserted that he and many commanders in Jalrez at first were very optimistic about

⁴⁷ Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008.

weapons collections because “We were very tired of wars; we thought that weapons collection is a good step for reconstruction and rehabilitation.”⁴⁸

After Janan talked with DIAG officials and confirmed that Jalrez District could obtain development projects if commanders surrendered more than 75% of targeted weapons, Janan visited every village to persuade commanders to surrender weapons in 2005. As a result, according to Janan, about 600 weapons and 1000 ammunitions were surrendered to the government. But unfortunately, these weapons were not counted by the DIAG program (or not registered as DIAG collection of weapons) because the weapons were released one month before DIAG officially started.

It seems certain that the weapons were surrendered to the government from Jalrez in 2005; one commander, who used to live in Jalrez and now is working in a high-ranked position (director level) in the Afghan government, told me that he surrendered about 50 weapons for DIAG, and he even presented the certificate by the government, which proved that he surrendered weapons. He asserts, “Many commanders in Jalrez did cooperate with DIAG, but nothing happened after that. It created huge mistrust in the DIAG program.”⁴⁹ There are several UN officials who were in charge of the DIAG in the region and remember that many Jalrez commanders surrendered weapons to the government.⁵⁰ Some of the UN staff were not certain about why those weapons were not counted as compliance by the DIAG Joint Secretariat. Because of this missed coordination and lack of explanation about why these weapons were not counted, the commanders mistrust the DIAG program and stopped cooperating with DIAG.

(2) Poverty

With regard to the possibility to persuade commanders to cooperate with DIAG in the future—in addition to addressing the issue of recounting weapons that were already surrendered to the government—there seems to be two fundamental problems in persuading commanders in Jalrez: poverty, or lack of jobs for commanders, and worsening security.

Poverty and lack of job opportunities in Jalrez give commanders a big incentive to sell their weapons in markets. It is said that commanders in Jalrez can obtain 600 to 700 USD by selling one AK-47 (Kalashnikov); thus, due to their own economic problems, commanders just sell their weapons to the market.⁵¹ According to my own survey, **43% of people surveyed in Jalrez (and 46% in Wardak in total) answered that their employment conditions have become worse compared with three years ago** (Appendix 1, Q. 2-F). That is 10% higher than those in Kohistan 1 or Koh Band, which have a higher compliance rate.

(3) Worsening Security

The other critical reason seems to be “worsening security.” One UN official lamented to me that “Jalrez has become their kingdom. We cannot enter their place anymore.” According to my opinion

⁴⁸ Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrat Janan, Chief of Provincial Council in Wardak, on 29 May 2008.

⁴⁹ Author’s interview with a commander who used to live in Jalrez, with condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

⁵⁰ Author confirmed several UN staff that commanders in Jalrez did surrender some of their weapons in 2005.

⁵¹ Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrad Janan on 29 May 2008.

survey, **55% of people in Jalrez (and 63.7% of people in Wardak Province) answered that their current life has become more dangerous compared with their life under the Taliban government** (Appendix 1, Q. 22). This result has a sharp contrast with the compliance districts such as Kohistan 1 and Koh Band, where an overwhelming majority of people think that their lives have become safer than their lives under the Taliban government. The survey by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission revealed that among 58 interviewees in Jalrez, 10 persons had families killed during the last 12 months in 2006.

Haji Ghulam Mohammed, who used to be one of the most powerful commanders in Jalrez, responded to my interview and asserted that “Jalrez is now totally out of control by the government.”⁵² Janan also argues that “commanders now believe that if they surrender weapons in current conditions, their lives will be endangered. And I frankly agree with their claim on this point.”⁵³

One commander, who used to be a commander in Jalrez and now works in a high-ranked position in the Afghan government, told me that “I used to be a commander in Jalrez and before surrendering weapons I and other commanders were very strong. After we surrendered weapons, Taliban came to our areas. Now, **even I cannot return to Jalrez because it is too insecure**. Jalrez is under the control of insurgents and the Taliban.”⁵⁴

And if improving the security is an important precondition for DIAG, the methods to improve security is a critical agenda even for enhancing the DIAG process. As one UN high-ranked official argues, “DIAG without reconciliation is meaningless. We need to have a comprehensive approach in advancing DIAG and reconciliation together; otherwise, it cannot work.”⁵⁵ This agenda of reconciliation as a critical method to improve the security in Afghanistan will be examined in the next chapter.

Recommendation for DIAG: Enhancing Its Credibility by Speeding Up the Implementation of DIAG Development Projects

What are policies to enhance the DIAG process? In the current security situation, it appears not so wise to take coercive methods and confiscate weapons because (1) it would create huge resentment from commanders in local regions who still have powers in Afghanistan, and (2) it would be easy for these commanders to buy new weapons in markets and start attacking the government if they became resentful against the government. **It must be much more effective to spread a good reputation and trust of the DIAG program** by demonstrating that DIAG continues to satisfy local commanders and people in districts where commanders complied with DIAG.

Unfortunately, examining compliance and noncompliance behaviors, this research found a critical problem in terms of implementing DIAG development projects: **very slow implementation of**

⁵² Author’s interview with Haji Ghulam Mohammed on 15 June 2008.

⁵³ Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrad Janan on 29 May 2008.

⁵⁴ Author’s interview with a commander who used to live in Jalrez, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

⁵⁵ Author’s interview with a UN high-ranked official, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

DIAG development projects after the compliance rate reached 75%. **Without fixing this problem, the DIAG can create a huge mistrust between the government and people** (and commanders in regions), which is very opposite to the objectives of DIAG.

Current Implementation of DIAG Development Projects

In both Koh Band and Kohistan 1 Districts in Kapisa Province, where commanders surrendered weapons and reached 75% compliance, the implementation of the development projects for DIAG is so slow that commanders who cooperated with DIAG were extremely frustrated and lost their trust in DIAG. Hassam-u-din, a commander in Koh Band, emphasized that “we did not see any progress in DIAG development projects. We feel that we were cheated by DIAG.”⁵⁶ Meraj-u-din, the commander in Kohistan 1, seriously insisted that “I now believe that we were tricked by DIAG and UN officials. Nothing happened after we surrendered weapons.”⁵⁷

Because of their mistrust and frustration, commanders in Kapisa started making “commander unions” and started opposing the government. A UN official who covered Kapisa region lamented, “it is a very dangerous sign for insurgency in the future. They are powerful people, and losing their trust can be very critical.”⁵⁸

This research confirmed that it is not a unique problem for Koh Band and Kohistan 1. As for the overall picture, **in 43 districts where the DIAG Joint Secretary asked the MRRD to implement DIAG development projects due to the compliance of commanders, only 2 districts have completed DIAG development projects** (as of 31 August 2008). The problem of the slow implementation of DIAG development projects is now shared by every important actor, such as UNDP, ANBP, UNAMA, the MRRD, and the DIAG Joint Secretariat.

(1) Misguided Identification of DIAG Projects at the District Level

The key reason for the delay of the projects is misguided identification of DIAG projects: When a district reaches 75% compliance, it is mainly the District Development Assembly in each district that identifies DIAG development projects. The District Development Assemblies consist of leaders from the Community Development Councils (CDC), which are community-level development councils. And in many districts that face a delay of projects, the District Development Assembly chose the DIAG development projects, which are much more expensive than the DIAG ceiling (150,000 USD per district).

The Koh Band case shows very typical problems of implementing DIAG development projects. In Koh Band, because commanders swiftly cooperated with DIAG, the district started discussion to identify the DIAG development project in early 2007. In April, 2007, the District Development Assembly in Koh Band requested 14 km of road construction, which is vital for their economic activities.

⁵⁶ Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008.

⁵⁷ Author’s interview with Meraj-u-din on 22 June 2008.

⁵⁸ Author’s interview with a UN official, with condition of anonymity, in 2008.

In this process, a MRRD official in charge of this district showed the list of projects written in the District Development Plan to the members of the District Development Assembly and asked them to choose a project from the list. The District Development Plan is mainly designed by the MRRD regional offices to identify future development projects for several years to come in each district; and the Plan is, in many cases, authorized by the District Development Assembly in each district.⁵⁹ The creation of the District Development Plans across Afghanistan is a part of projects by the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) implemented by both UNDP and the MRRD.

An official of the MRRD office in Kapisa used this list to guide the members of the District Development Assembly in Koh Band to choose the projects for DIAG. This action was actually guided by DIAG, as the “DIAG concept paper” clearly asks DIAG projects to be linked with existing programs, such as NABDP. It says, “The DIAG development component will be in line with existing development initiatives (such as NABDP)...it is envisioned that DIAG...would employ the NABDP project implementation structure for delivery of some of the community projects.”⁶⁰

Due to this guidance, it was reasonable for the MRRD officials to use the District Development Plan to guide the District Development Assembly to choose the DIAG project. However, **the problem is that the projects on the list of the District Development Plans tend to be much more expensive than the DIAG ceiling** because it is the list for “desires” to advance development in each region for several years, without a financial basis.

In Koh Band, after the District Development Assembly chose road construction as a DIAG project, it took about 6 months just to estimate the cost of the project (the slow estimation of the cost is the second important cause for the delay of DIAG projects, as we will see later). The MRRD engineer teams finally presented a long report on the estimate of the cost for the road construction project and announced that it would cost about 1 million USD, while the DIAG ceiling is 150,000 USD.

The MRRD offices in charge of the project in Kapisa tried to combine the DIAG project with a Counter-Narcotics project to cover the cost, but it was rejected by the officials in charge of Counter-Narcotics because the combination of DIAG and Counter-Narcotics is still much lower than the cost of road construction (and combining two different projects is always very difficult at the local level in Afghanistan, due to a lack of experts).

As an alternative, the District Development Assembly in Koh Band identified the construction of a school, but it was rejected again due to the high cost of constructing schools. Actually, many other districts also chose schools as the DIAG development project, and their proposals were rejected because of the cost (the average cost for building a school is 220,000 USD). In short, **Koh Band had wasted more than one year just in selecting the development project for DIAG.**

In the initial stage of identification, the MRRD officials did not show the DIAG ceiling to the members of the District Development Assembly because they thought that “the ceiling of DIAG is too low to encourage the commanders to surrender weapons.”⁶¹ There was also no engineer

⁵⁹ Some District Development Plans are cited in the website of MRRD. http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/DDP_1.htm

⁶⁰ DIAG Concept Paper written for implementation of DIAG.

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Hayatullah Farhang, Head of MRRD office in Kapisa, who is in charge of DIAG projects in

participating in the discussion of selecting the projects, so it was difficult to inform them of approximate estimated costs before they formally identified the projects.

This practice represents the typical problems of legitimacy construction. **The creation of over-expectation without clear explanation about the budget ceiling, as well as the lack of explanation about slow implementation of development projects, just keeps eroding the legitimacy of the domestic government and the international actors in charge of DIAG.**

The research has not clarified how prevalent this practice—using the list of the District Development Plan to identify the DIAG projects—is; however, first, the DIAG concept paper requests DIAG to be linked with NABDP. Second, there is no question that projects identified by many compliance districts were found to cost more than the DIAG ceiling and have been rejected after spending several months to estimate the costs; for example, the project identified in Kohistan 1 (protection wall) was estimated to cost 700,000 USD; the project identified in Khuram Wa Sarbagh District was estimated to cost over 1 million USD; the project identified in Bangi District was estimated to cost 400,000 USD. There is no doubt that the misguided initial identification is a critical cause for the delay of the DIAG development projects.

(2) Lack of Personnel to Design Projects, Estimate Costs, and Implement Them

The lack of staff to implement DIAG economic projects is also serious. It takes almost 4 months just to estimate costs of identified projects, while it is possible to complete an estimate in one month in other programs. Thus, what often happens is that 4 or 5 months after commanders fully complied with DIAG weapons collection and districts selected DIAG development projects, commanders heard that DIAG cannot implement the projects due to the budget ceiling. Because the MRRD tends to show the list of big-budget projects (such as the District Development Plan) to give commanders an incentive to surrender weapons, commanders and local leaders perceive they have been “cheated.”

Impacts of Delay of DIAG Development Projects on Credibility

If the DIAG continued to create this sense of “cheating” and mistrust in the government, **it would create a huge damage to the credibility of the government and the UN agencies in charge of DIAG.** It is very serious because the DIAG started the weapon collections in districts where commanders and people tend to be supportive of the government; the government would lose the trust and confidence even in areas supportive of the government.

And the slow implementation of DIAG development projects makes it difficult for the DIAG officials to persuade the commanders in newly identified districts to surrender weapons. For example, a DIAG official in charge of persuading commanders to surrender weapons in the regions seriously appealed to me, “This slow implementation of DIAG development projects in Kapisa is almost going to kill the whole DIAG process. Commanders in newly targeted districts always told me that ‘We know what happened to compliance districts such as Koh Band or Kohistan 1: there is no development project implemented. We will not be cheated by DIAG!’”⁶² He also lamented, “I am

Koh Band, on 25 June 2008.

⁶² Author’s interview with one of the IAG officials in charges of Kapisa, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

also threatened by commanders in Koh Band and Kohistan 1 who have already surrendered weapons because there is no project implemented. Those commanders are losing trust and popularity of their people.”⁶³

Recommendations

It seems obvious that it is urgent to change the practice of implementing DIAG development projects so that the DIAG program, the Afghan government, and international actors such as the UN agencies can restore the trust of commanders and people. From the analyses above, I recommend the following:

(1) In order to make proper identification in the initial stage, the DIAG Joint Secretariat and the MRRD should create a list of projects that can be implemented within the DIAG ceiling and distribute it to each district so that the District Development Assemblies or other district authorities can choose proper projects in the initial identification. It would also be very beneficial if the MRRD could dispatch one engineer to guide the discussion of the District Development Assembly and give them proper estimates and suggestions for selecting projects.

It is also important to explain the DIAG ceiling from the beginning; the projects might be modest, but it is critical to give an honest explanation and to implement projects very quickly so that it can enhance the creation of trust between the government and local political leaders (and people); that is the ultimate goal of DIAG.

(2) In order to speed up the implementation, it is also important to increase the DIAG staff to implement DIAG development projects, including experts in designing projects, estimating costs, and procuring materials for projects.

It is encouraging that both the head of UNDP, Anita Nirody, and the Japanese ambassador, Hideo Sato, recognize the criticality of this problem and started making serious efforts to speed up the implementation of DIAG development projects. (Japan is a major financial contributor to the DIAG.) Their initiative needs to be supported by both Afghan and international authorities.

(3) UNAMA should be mandated to monitor and even supervise the whole process of DIAG; without the UNAMA involvement to supervise whole processes, responsible implementation will continue to be challenged. As for the Koh Band DIAG project, only after UNAMA national staff decided to be deeply involved in selecting projects, by taking a risk of doing tasks beyond their limited mandates, did the provincial governor, MRRD, and DDA members become serious and succeed in selecting projects. It demonstrates how important it is for UNAMA to be clearly mandated to supervise the DIAG process. **It is risky and even dangerous for the international actors to depend on local ownership and to escape from its responsibility in such a key political program**, when the involvement of the UN is a critical component in the compliance mechanism.

It may be true that the size of DIAG development projects might be small compared with other development projects. However, because the DIAG is so political and involves key political and

⁶³ Ibid.

military stakeholders in each region, it is very crucial to fulfill the promise of the government in very quick and honest ways so that it can enhance the credibility and trust between the government and local people.

At the same time, DIAG itself cannot change the regaining insurgency in Afghanistan, which has become a critical impediment for the Afghan reconstruction and the creation of legitimate government in the long run. In order to address this security issue caused by insurgency, this report proceeds to analyze the issue of reconciliation in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Reconciliation

Background: Worsening Security and Hope for Reconciliation

The security conditions are deteriorating in Afghanistan. According to the “Afghanistan Index” by the Brookings Institution, the estimated number of Afghan civilian fatalities as a direct result of fighting between pro-government forces and anti-government entities jumped from 929 in 2006 to 1633 in 2007.⁶⁴ The same trend continues in 2008. The opinion survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2007 found that among the Afghans who answered that “things are going in the wrong direction,” 48% of the Afghans asserted that it was because of “insecurity”; that was the first reason for going in the wrong direction in 2007.⁶⁵ In contrast, it was only 6% of Afghans who answered “insecurity” as a reason for going in the wrong direction in 2006.⁶⁶ The Report of the Secretary-General on 6 March 2008 proclaimed, “In 2007 the level of insurgent and terrorist activity increased sharply from that of the previous year. An average of 566 incidents per month was recorded in 2007, compared to 425 per month in the previous year...Thirty-six out of 376 districts, including most districts in the east, south-east and south, remain largely inaccessible to Afghan officials and aid workers.”⁶⁷

Facing the deteriorating security, many leaders of both domestic and international peacebuilders are now calling for a serious negotiation and reconciliation with insurgents, including at least some parts of the Taliban. In September, 2007, **Afghan President Hamid Karzai officially called for negotiation with the Taliban** in a press conference: “For the security and prosperity of the Afghan people...we are ready for any type of discussion and negotiations.”⁶⁸ Karzai even offered to meet with Taliban Leader Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a factional warlord leader, and insisted that if a group of Taliban militants came to Karzai and offered to halt attacks in exchange for a role in government, he would accept.⁶⁹

UNAMA, which was mandated for reconciliation by the UN Security Council resolution, is making a serious effort to conduct “political outreach” to enhance the reconciliation with various political groups, including insurgents.⁷⁰ Christopher Alexander, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRG), asserted that there might be substantial numbers of insurgent groups who might be sympathetic to the Taliban, and they might feel that they are excluded from the peacebuilding process; thus, “that is critical for UNAMA to navigate them to think that they are included and they are parts of peacebuilding efforts.”⁷¹ It appears that this sense of exclusiveness is a critical factor in motivating some factions to be supportive to the insurgency, including the

⁶⁴ Brookings 2008. “Afghanistan Index” on 16 September 2008. The original data comes from Human Rights Watch.

⁶⁵ The Asia Foundation 2007. “Afghanistan in 2007” The Asia Foundation conducted opinion survey in both 2006 and 2007 with more than 6000 Afghan people across the country.

⁶⁶ Ibid.,13.

⁶⁷ The Report of Secretary General on 6 March 2008. “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.”

⁶⁸ Reuters on 11 September 2007. “Afghanistan’s Karzai urges Taliban to negotiate”

⁶⁹ CTV News on 29 September 2007. “Karzai offers government office to Taliban.”

⁷⁰ The UN Security Council Resolution 1806, adopted on 20 March 2008.

⁷¹ Author’s interview with Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, on 21 February 2008.

Taliban.⁷² He emphasized, **“Thus, the reconciliation process should be one of the most important jobs for UNAMA in the next few years.”**⁷³

ISAF, consisting of NATO, also supports the reconciliation under some conditions. Maurits Jochems, ambassador and NATO senior Civilian Representative, told me that “NATO supports the reconciliation under some conditions... First, the reconciliation should be led by Afghan authorities; second, the insurgents who reconcile with the government should accept the Afghan constitution; third, they should stop using military approaches.”⁷⁴ And he claims that NATO supports and expects UNAMA to push the reconciliation forward.⁷⁵

It is not only domestic and international peacebuilders who are seeking the possibility of reconciliation but also ordinary Afghans; it should be noted that an overwhelming majority of Afghan people strongly support the reconciliation as the only way to establish peace in Afghanistan.

According to my opinion survey in June 2008, **94% people surveyed in Kandahar (Pashtun-dominated area), 98% in Wardak (Pashtun-dominated area), and 86% in Kapisa (Kohistan 1 and Koh Band Districts; Tajik-dominated area) responded that reconciliation with insurgent groups, including the Taliban, is the first priority to establish peace in Afghanistan** (Appendix 1, Q. 18). It is also important to recognize that **98% in Kandahar, 98% in Wardak, and 70% in Kapisa support the idea of a coalition between the Karzai government and the Taliban** (Appendix 1, Q. 19). And 94% in Kandahar, 97% in Wardak, and 69% in Kapisa answered that they support the coalition because it is necessary to establish peace in Afghanistan (Appendix 1, Q. 20).

In 2007, Environics, the Canadian research group, surveyed 1578 Afghan people across the country and found a similar trend; 74% of people in Afghanistan and 85% in Kandahar Province supported the negotiation between the Karzai government and the Taliban.⁷⁶ With regard to the idea of a coalition government in which the Karzai government shares power with the Taliban, 54% of people in the country and 74% in Kandahar support the idea.⁷⁷ These results seem consistent with the result of my own survey, considering many people in the North, especially Hazara people who were so harshly oppressed by the Taliban regime, must dislike the idea of the coalition. The worsening security might also increase the support for negotiation and reconciliation in 2008.

Thus, there seems to be a consensus among international peacebuilders, domestic peacebuilders, and ordinary people about a critical need to advance more inclusiveness and the reconciliation with insurgents, including the Taliban. However, how is it possible? Is it actually practical or feasible? In order to address these questions, we need to start asking who the Taliban are. Without defining the Taliban, it must be difficult to judge whether or not negotiating with the Taliban is possible.

⁷² According to the survey by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, among 58 villagers in Jalrez district, where the insurgency is very active, 20 villagers answered that they were wrongly excluded from development project because of their tribes and ethnicity.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Author's interview with Maurits Jochems, Ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representative, on 19 June 2008.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Environics 2007. “2007 Survey of Afghans.” The research was conducted in partnership with three Canadian media sponsors – the Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation (CBC), The Globe and Mail, and La Presse.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Who Are the Taliban? Two Different Views

There seems to be two major different views about what the Taliban is and whether reconciliation is possible. One view was represented by Ahmed Wali Karzai, who is a younger brother of President Karzai, the Chief of the Provincial Council in Kandahar, and seen as the most powerful government figure in Kandahar Province. He asserts that although negotiation with the Taliban is the most important agenda, as the government cannot kill everybody, it is almost impossible to negotiate with the Taliban “because the Taliban is invisible.”⁷⁸

In his view, the Taliban is an insurgent organization that is led by leaders who always hide themselves in a foreign country and is actually supported or even controlled by a foreign country, namely Pakistan. He claims, “We know who are behind insurgency in other countries; we know their leaders by names, but they are not visible. They keep hiding themselves on the other side of the territory. We have not seen them....How can we negotiate with the leaders who are not visible?”⁷⁹ Asked about the call by the President Karzai for reconciliation, he responded, “We are calling for reconciliation by asking ‘where are you’? But there is no response from the other side. In fact, we are reconciling but they are hiding!”⁸⁰

In sum, Ahmed Wali Karzai asserted that because negotiation and reconciliation is possible only when they can talk with the leadership of opponents, it is actually impossible to reconcile with the Taliban. Because of this view about the Taliban and the reconciliation, **the only solution for the insurgency in Afghanistan, in his view, is to fight against the Taliban stationed in Pakistan.**

On the other hand, there is a different view about the components of the Taliban. Hanaitullah Kochai, who is the Provincial Council member in Kapisa Province and lives in Tagab District (insurgency-active district), argued that “if there are 420 Taliban soldiers in Tagab, 400 are working for the Taliban to obtain 100 USD per month as the Taliban gives them salary; thus, **those 400 soldiers are not ideologically driven.** It is only 20 Taliban soldiers who are ideologically driven and actually controlled by Pakistan.”⁸¹ In that sense, Kochai asserted, **“We can negotiate with those 400 soldiers and persuade them to the side of the government if the government can provide them with jobs and security.”**⁸² But unfortunately, Kochai emphasized, “People in our district feel that the government did nothing for them in the last several years.”⁸³

The view of Kochai—a majority of the Taliban soldiers are cooperating or working for the Taliban to obtain economic needs and their own security (those Taliban soldiers can keep at least physical security if they work for the Taliban in areas where there is no pro-government police and army, including international forces)—is shared by many government officials, UN officials, high-ranked officials of members states (including some ambassadors), and a majority of ordinary Afghan people.

⁷⁸ Author’s interview with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Chief of Provincial Council in Kandahar Province, on 8 June 2008.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Author’s interview with Hanaitullah Kochai, the Provincial Council Member in Kapisa Province, on 3 June 2008.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

For example, Najibullah Mojadidi, the acting director of the PTS program (the national reconciliation program in Afghanistan that will be explained in more detail in the following sections), explained what the Taliban offers to the ordinary Afghan: “Because we are constantly talking with former Taliban soldiers, we know what the Taliban offers to them. If people join the Taliban and fight against the government, they can obtain 100 USD per month; if they conduct kidnapping by following orders of the Taliban, they can get about 400 USD per month; and if they conduct suicide attacks, their family will gain economic guarantee for their entire lives.”⁸⁴ It is also told that the Taliban in the South give credit to the farmers who produce poppy and cooperate with the Taliban prior to their cultivation of the poppy, so those farmers can obtain economic benefits even if their poppy products might be confiscated by the government. Thus, according to one UN official in Kandahar, it cannot be denied that there is some economic benefit for farmers in the South to cooperate with the Taliban.

Mohammad Shapoor, Colonel from the Ministry of Defense in charge of the security in Wardak Province (Pashtun area), also asserted, “As long as there is no job and facility to work for people, people will do anything to survive. Once they have jobs, they will be very busy at their work and will have no reasons to fight. That is why we need to have reconciliation with those people.”⁸⁵

Likewise, one villager from Maydan Shahr district (Pashtun) answered my opinion survey and said, “Some of the Taliban are fighting to make a complete Islamic state here. But some of them are working just for money.” One villager from Koh Band district (Tajik) in Kapisa Province said, “I agree with the idea of negotiation or even coalition with the Taliban if they are Afghan Taliban. I disagree with foreign Taliban, such as Pakistan Taliban or al-Qaida because they have objectives to create conflict in Afghanistan.”

In addition to this view that a majority of the Taliban soldiers are working for economic and social needs, there is a shared understanding that Afghanistan consists of various tribes, and **those tribes can be swayed between the pro-government and the anti-government, depending on their perception and trust in the government and the Taliban.**

Jelani Popal, the Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), and one of the closest officials to President Karzai, insisted that “the community or tribes in Afghanistan at village level are so strong that if a community has a consensus that they will not allow the Taliban to enter, it becomes very difficult for the Taliban to enter that community... **Now the communities do not think that the current government is good, so they are indifferent to the government. They are not Taliban but they are not pro-government either.**”⁸⁶ Thus, he asserted, “We need to have strong integrated approaches to take these communities to the side of the government, by improving local governance including police and justices, following promises for people, and reconstructing economic activities in communities.”⁸⁷

Mohammad Ehsan Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and

⁸⁴ Author’s interview with Najibullah Mojadidi, the Acting Director of PTS program, on 17 February 2008.

⁸⁵ Author’s interview with Mohammad Shapoor, Colonel at the Ministry of Defense in charge of Wardak Province, on 19 June 2008.

⁸⁶ Author’s interview with Jelani Popal, Director of Independent Directorate of Local Governance, on 4 June 2008.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

one of the most respected ministers in the Afghan government, said that “there are mainly two categories of Afghan people; one is the supporters of the government, and **the second is the people who are waiting and thinking about which side they should support**... Many people want to participate in the reconstruction of our country and restore the life of their family. We need to satisfy these needs and hopes of people to pull them to the side of the government.”⁸⁸

One Afghan security expert, who lives in Kandahar and works for one of the international organizations, explained the relationship between the insurgents (including the Taliban) and the local government: “Those insurgent groups or illegal armed groups are double-hand shaking; during night, they might shake hands with the Taliban, do some criminal activities, and become threats to the government, but during the daytime, they might shake hands with the government. The reason is that those people are not sure about the credibility of the current government... Thus it is critical for the government to obtain trust and credibility of people.”⁸⁹

If accepting these views, it seems plausible to categorize three complements of the Taliban.

- (1) Core members of the Taliban, including al-Qaida or some groups coming from foreign states.
- (2) Afghan Taliban who are fighting to obtain economic needs and security.
- (3) Various (and numerous) tribes and communities that can be swayed between the government and anti-government elements, including the Taliban.

It must be important to have different strategies for different categories of the Taliban.

Who Can Be Targets for the Reconciliation?

There is a shared a view that under current Afghan conditions, reconciliation with the core members of the Taliban seems extremely difficult because the core members of the Taliban seem not to have any incentive to make substantial concessions to the Afghan government, due to their ideological structure as well as their gaining territorial control. Popal, the director of IDLG, claimed that “reconciliation can work only when you are strong compared with your opponents. Now the Taliban is confident, so reconciliation with them must be very difficult, although we are open to everybody as long as they accept our constitution and the harmony of the state.”⁹⁰ Minister Zia also argued that he was very pessimistic about reconciliation with the Taliban core members because of their ideological stances and origins: “Can we negotiate with al-Qaida?... In reality, Afghan Taliban leaders do not have authority to control the Taliban insurgency. It is al-Qaida and other international terrorists who make a decision on their fates.”⁹¹

If it is difficult to negotiate with core members of the Taliban, **the main target for reconciliation in the current situation should be low- and middle-level soldiers who fight for the Taliban because**

⁸⁸ Author’s interview with Mohammad Ehsan Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), on 31 May 2008.

⁸⁹ Author’s interview with one Afghan security expert living in Kandahar province, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

⁹⁰ Author’s interview with Jelani Popal, Director of Independent Directorate of Local Governance, on 4 June 2008.

⁹¹ Author’s interview with Mohammad Ehsan Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), on 31 May 2008.

of their economic and social needs, as well as tribes and groups who are considering which side they should belong to.

At the same time, I argue that it is also critical for the government—and peacebuilders as a whole in Afghanistan—to **open the window for reconciliation with even core members of the Taliban because it is always important to show an “exit strategy” for these insurgents so that they can be a part of the government if they lay down their weapons and accept the constitution**, as President Karzai insisted last year. Fighting the insurgents without giving them an “exit strategy” would push them to the corner and make them fight back for a long time.

The Problems of the Current Reconciliation Program

The only existing mechanism for reconciliation in Afghanistan is PTS (Strengthening Peace Program in Dari) led by the former president Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, who is now a chair of the Upper House in Parliament, and his son, Najibullah Mojadidi, who is the acting director for PTS. PTS was initiated in 2005 to advance the reconciliation with individual insurgent soldiers, including the Taliban soldiers.

In PTS, first, an individual soldier sends an application with his or her promise not to conduct any military attacks against the government and to follow the Afghan constitution, as well as the signatures of key local political figures, such as chiefs of police in their districts, district governors, and tribe leaders. The PTS committee will review the applications, and if appropriate, the Afghan government sends them the letters to promise not to detain or kill those individuals. There are about 4600 individuals who joined PTS by the end of 2007.

Unfortunately, the PTS has already lost credibility from both Afghan people and the international community. The main reasons are the following:

(1) Taliban members who joined PTS have no guarantee of safety from the international forces, especially from American counterterrorism operations.

There are several prominent cases in which members who joined PTS were attacked by American forces. For example, in Alasay District in Kapisa Province, one former Taliban commander, known as Hafizallah, who controlled over 50 Taliban former soldiers, was invited by the Provincial Council members in Kapisa to join PTS and work for the provincial government. Hafizallah formally joined PTS in summer of 2007 and actively cooperated with the provincial government. Abdul Wahaab, who is a Provincial Council member in Kapisa living in Alasay District, emphasized that “I talked with Hafizallah to work with us to support the provincial government. And I and the Chief of Provincial Council persuaded Hafizallah to join PTS.”⁹²

As a result, Hafizallah formally joined the PTS and got the letter from the government to prove that he was admitted as a PTS member who reconciled with the government. Two months later (in the fall of 2007), he was invited by U.S. forces to come to Graham Base for a meeting and was arrested by

⁹² Author’s interview with Abdul Wahaab, a Provincial Council member in Kapisa Province, on 3 June 2008.

U.S. forces.⁹³ Wahaab and Kochai, another Provincial Council member in Kapisa, emphasized that they did not know any reason why Hafizallah was arrested by the U.S. forces. Wahaab asserted that Hafizallah was supposed to bring his 50 subordinates to join the PTS and reconcile with the government. However, after this arrest, those people from Alasay District stopped joining PTS.

Thus, Wahaab asked UN officials as well as the head of the PTS program, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, the chair of the Upper House in the Parliament, to ask the U.S. forces to release Hafizallah because “he was really cooperative with the government and the Provincial Council in Kapisa.”⁹⁴ But nothing happened after their appeals. In the end, “people in our district do not trust us (Provincial Council members) with regard to PTS.”⁹⁵ This story was spread all over the central regions. There is also a largely shared perception that PTS members were attacked by air bombs of the U.S. counter-terrorism operations (Operation Enduring Freedom), which sometimes created civilian casualties as well.

(2) Taliban members who joined PTS have no way to make a living after they cut links to and salaries from Taliban.

It is obvious that former Taliban soldiers who joined PTS tend to have extreme difficulty making a living after they terminate the links to the Taliban, when the overall employment situation in Afghanistan is very harsh. Najibullah Mojadidi, the acting director of PTS, lamented, “While the Taliban offers each soldier 100 USD per month for salaries, we cannot give them anything!”⁹⁶

Haji Aghalalai, the head of the PTS office in Kandahar Province and one of the Provincial Council members in Kandahar, also emphasized that **economic difficulty after joining PTS, such as lack of jobs and houses, is a key impediment for inviting the Taliban soldiers to join PTS.** This also creates distance between the government and former soldiers joining PTS, he said. “The government, including the former President Mojadidi, even promised Taliban soldiers that they would get jobs, houses, and political rights, if they joined PTS. But, unfortunately we did not follow any of these promises so far. It created a big mistrust among the people who might think about PTS and join it.”⁹⁷ It was true that the head of PTS, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, tried to create financial programs to support the former Taliban who joined the PTS, but the program has not been realized. Aghalalai lamented, “This office itself gets only 600 USD per month; thus we do not have enough cars, equipment, and other expenditures to operate our program. How can we then support the former soldiers who joined PTS?”⁹⁸

(3) Taliban members who joined PTS would be targets of Taliban retaliations, and the government cannot protect them.

If the Taliban try to retaliate against those who join PTS, it is difficult for the government to protect

⁹³ This fact was well known to not only Afghan provincial council members but also UN officials covering the area.

⁹⁴ Author’s interview with Abdul Wahaab, a Provincial Council member in Kapisa Province, on 3 June 2008. Kochi and other provincial council members also agreed with Wahaab on this point.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Author’s interview with Najibullah Mojadidi, the Acting Director of PTS program, on 17 February 2008.

⁹⁷ Author’s interview with Haji Aghalalai, the Head of PTS office in Kandahar, on 10 June 2008.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

them, as in many Pashtun-dominated areas there is no functioning police. Aghalalai claimed, “The former Taliban soldiers who joined PTS hide their documents and go back to the rural areas where they live. But when the Taliban ask those PTS members to attack the government again, those people would refuse to cooperate. Then, they are in great danger because the Taliban would kill them in retaliation.”⁹⁹ Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Chief of Provincial Council in Kandahar, also argued, “If the government needs to protect every Taliban who reconciled with the government, how many people will have to be protected by the government? We simply cannot protect so many individuals.”¹⁰⁰

Recommendations for Reconciliation

For the reasons above, it appears that the PTS has already lost credibility among Afghan people. There is also concern about PTS credibility and accountability among the international community.¹⁰¹ Thus, it is very difficult for the international community to provide PTS with substantial funding for massive economic projects in coordination with the reconciliation program.

That is why I propose that it is vital for UNAMA to initiate rearranging a new reconciliation committee composed of every important actor, such as the Presidential Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, UNAMA, ISAF, and American Counterterrorism Forces. The existing PTS commission can be integrated into this new committee. Then, this new committee can take the following steps.

- (1) Set clear goals and strategies for all peacebuilders, including U.S. counterterrorism forces, ISAF, UNAMA, and top leaders in the Afghan government.
- (2) Start a massive program to create vocational centers all over the country for both Taliban soldiers who join in the reconciliation and other non-Taliban people.
- (3) Pass a UN resolution to remove the Taliban members from the UN Sanction list if they join in the new reconciliation program. It would shake the “moderate Taliban leaders.”
- (4) Negotiate with “national Taliban,” who dislike the al-Qaida or Pakistan-driven terrorist infusions; it may open the window to include “national Taliban” in the government structure.

(1) It is crucial for UNAMA to initiate talks between the Afghan government, International Forces, American Forces, and UNAMA to share clear goals and strategies. President Karzai’s decision to deport two international staff who contacted heads of the Taliban organization stopped many UNAMA staff from attempting reconciliation efforts with insurgent commanders and groups.

According to my opinion survey, **100% in Kandahar, 96% in Wardak, and 80% in Kapisa responded that they support the idea that if the Taliban surrender their weapons, the Afghan government should allow the Taliban to participate in the next election.** (Appendix 1, Q. 17) Many top leaders in the Afghan government also argue that they can accept the Taliban if they lay down their weapons and accept the Afghan constitution. It is critical to set clear goals on the

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Author’s interview with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Chief of Provincial Council in Kandahar Province, on 8 June 2008.

¹⁰¹ Several UN officials claimed that PTS asked non-insurgents to send applications to demonstrate that the program is working.

reconciliation and share them among key domestic and international peacebuilders in Afghanistan.

Then, when the new reconciliation committee issues a guarantee to former Taliban soldiers who join the new reconciliation program, the guarantee should be shared by every actor. **It can guarantee, at least, safety from international forces.**

It is not actually a huge step, at least in theory. The current PTS is supposed to give former Taliban the guarantee of no custody or attack from both Afghan government and ISAF (international forces); only American forces will join the new committee. **It is vital to have every actor in the same boat for the reconciliation.**

(2) After clear goals and strategies are confirmed by the main actors above, the new reconciliation committee would start a massive program to create vocational centers all over the country. The significant way to encourage former Taliban soldiers to join the reconciliation is to create sustainable job opportunities after the reconciliation; and many vocational centers in entire regions can encourage many “Afghan Taliban soldiers” to join the new reconciliation program. (Many Pakistanis come to Kandahar to work in construction jobs, as many Afghans do not have skills for those jobs; vocational centers can create substantial job opportunities.¹⁰²)

It may be important for vocational centers to accept both former Taliban joining in reconciliation and other non-Taliban villagers, because it can treat both former Taliban and non-Taliban equally; it also might have a preventive effect on Taliban retaliation because of the popularity of vocational centers in communities.

The need to increase employment opportunities is very urgent; according to my opinion poll, 46% in Kandahar and Wardak and 36% in Kapisa answered that their employment is worse compared with three years ago. As I will write in the next section, projects by the Community Development Council (CDC) are extremely popular among Afghan people. When vocational centers decide the program of training, it will be beneficial to consult with CDC members and try to create the best training programs for different industries and agriculture in each region.

In short, **training programs can be linked with future CDC economic projects as well as small credit programs in creating small enterprises in local areas, such as the Afghan Rural Enterprise Development Program. It can create more sustainable job opportunities.**

(3) Additionally, to enhance the reconciliation with core but flexible Taliban leaders, it is crucial for the UN Security Council to make a new resolution that if Taliban on the UN Sanction list decide to join the new reconciliation program, they will be removed from the list (Now there are about 20 Taliban former leaders on the list who already joined PTS). This discussion has continued for 4 years in the UN Security Council; it is time to make a critical decision to induce some Taliban leaders to the side of government.

(4) Although it may be difficult to induce concessions from core members of the Taliban, especially

¹⁰² Author's interview with a UN official who is very familiar with the situation in Kandahar, with the condition of anonymity, in 2008.

Pakistan- or al-Qaida-driven Taliban who are “international Taliban,” it is still possible to negotiate with “Afghan Taliban” whose main objective is to control their country themselves and who need to have economic opportunities for survival. One of the critical policies could be **to reconcile with these “national insurgents” and transform them into government officials, including local security forces or police** who can be paid a sufficient salary and receive physical protection from the Taliban’s retaliation. It is important for the government to obtain clear-cut control over these new government officials, but it is also crucial to give them incentive to support the government and to exclude the Pakistan- or al-Qaida-driven Taliban from their community.¹⁰³

It is crucial to implement those policies simultaneously in very decisive ways so that both domestic and international peacebuilders in Afghanistan can show a clear political will to reconcile with the insurgents if they lay down weapons and accept the constitution. That is actually the principle which has already been adopted by the government in the existing reconciliation program, such as PTS.

International Forces are still important to increase the cost for the Taliban to fight and to push “national Taliban” commanders and soldiers to consider reconciliation with the government. But without reconciliation, military operations alone can push them into a corner and decisive fighting for a long time in the future. In that sense, **those military operations need to have very high-level coordination with political programs, including reconciliation.** Afghanistan has only one year left before the next presidential election. It is time to make a decision on reconciliation.

¹⁰³ The strategy by the US forces in Iraq since 2007 might be insightful for this issue; US forces actually started supporting the national (mainly Sunni) insurgents who disliked the Al-Qaida elements in Iraq and paying payroll of 365 USD per month to these national Iraqi insurgents. Now US forces support about 100,000 former Iraqi insurgents by this payroll; Steven Simon (2008) argues in the journal *Foreign Affairs* that this policy is the biggest factor that has drastically reduced the Iraqi attacks against the US forces since 2007. US forces claim that a half of the payroll will start to be paid by the Iraqi government in the future (CNN 9 September 2008).

Chapter 4: Resource Distribution (Government Service) and Local Ownership

Background: Request for Local Ownership and Concern About Corruption

There is a shared consensus among both domestic and international peacebuilders that the improvement of living conditions by resource distribution (or peace dividends) is critical in constructing the legitimacy of newly created governments in post-conflict situations. For example, Jelani Popal, the Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), asserted that “I always emphasize that the legitimacy of the government does not come only from votes of elections; **the legitimacy is created by two important components: one is the security, such as physical security, food security, and job security; the second is public services, which enable Afghan people to perceive that their living conditions are getting better.** Those two are the most important components for constructing legitimacy.”¹⁰⁴

While almost all peacebuilders define the improvement of living conditions as one of critical factors in constructing legitimacy, many domestic peacebuilders—the Afghan government official in this case—urged that the assistance projects should be conducted through the government so that people can perceive that their living conditions are getting better because of the government’s efforts. **Ehsan Zia, the Minister of the Rural Rehabilitation & Development** emphasized that “after 23 years’ war, the Afghan state lost its legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan people... In order to restore the legitimacy of the government, the government should be seen as a leader of state-building and state-reconstruction; **people need to see that it is their government that leads the reconstruction of their states, offers public service, and improves their living conditions.**”¹⁰⁵

Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance, also claimed that there are two fundamental merits to flow the international assistance through the government: “**First, if the assistance is implemented through the government, the cost of the implementation is much cheaper; second, the government can obtain more legitimacy from the people and then more stability,** which is beneficial for both Afghan people and the international community.”¹⁰⁶ Arian Sharifi, the spokesman for the Ministry of Finance, added, “The Afghan government uses only 30% of all money from the international community. The other 70% is directly conducted by donor states; that might not damage the legitimacy of the government, but it certainly will not improve it.”¹⁰⁷ The 2007 national fiscal budget in Afghanistan shows that 77.9% of the total budget was the “external budget” that was spent directly by international donors, while 22.1% of the total budget was the government budget composed of “operating budget” and “development budget.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Author’s interview with Jelani Popal, the Director of the Independent Directorate of the Local Governance, on 4 June 2008

¹⁰⁵ Author’s interview with Ehsan Zia, the Minister of the Rural Rehabilitation & Development, on 31 May 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Author’s interview with Anwar-ul-Ahadi, the Minister of Finance, on 28 June 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Author’s interview with Arian Sharifi, the Spokesman of the Ministry of Finance, on 29 May 2008.

¹⁰⁸ 2008 National Budget by the Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan. The 2008 fiscal budget plan explains the composition of the 2007 fiscal budget as well: The external budget was 10,221 million USD, while the government operating budget was 1,096 million USD and the government development budget was 1,797 million USD.

This claim is echoed at the level of the local government. Rona Terren, the director of Women's Affairs in the Kandahar provincial government, insisted that international donors do not consult with local government officials in terms of their assistance projects. For example, she is meeting a number of women who have problems such as domestic violence and economic difficulties on daily basis; thus, she and her department know the needs of the females in Kandahar, but donors tend to implement the projects even for women without consulting with her and her department. She stressed, "The foreign assistance should be conducted thorough or in consultation with the government; otherwise, it will not strengthen the credibility of the local government."¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, the international community, especially donor states, has substantial skepticism and concern about the accountability and corruption of local authorities. Terren admitted, "Corruption is the biggest problem in this country; there is so much corruption at every level in Afghanistan. It makes everything difficult." Thus, she concluded, "**The international donors need to find good officials who can be trusted to deal with assistance programs, and these programs need to be monitored by donors in transparent ways.**"¹¹⁰

In general, after 7 years has passed since the reconstruction effort started—it may mean that the government starts having some capability to implement various projects—the claim by the Afghan governments for "local ownership with regard to assistance projects" is persuasive and strong. As long as monitoring and accountability is going to be strengthened, the local ownership of the assistance program should be encouraged.

Anita Nirody, the Country Director of UNDP in Afghanistan, summarized the argument: "In the Paris conference in 2008, the Afghan government, headed by the Minister of Finance, Ahadi, made a strong case why the international assistance should be flowed through the government to increase the credibility and efficiency of the assistance for the people...The international community in Paris strongly endorsed this argument that the international assistance needs to be conducted through the channel of the local government."¹¹¹ She added, "Of course, there are concerns by the international donors on the accountability of the programs and on how the concerns of their taxpayers can be dealt with; and in order to address these concerns, the monitoring system to secure the accountability should continue to be strengthened." But in the overall picture, "**there is optimism about a consensus that more and more assistance should be implemented through the government's channels.**"¹¹²

Examining the Community Development Council (CDC) Projects and Their Impacts

To address this question of the relationship among local ownership, resource distribution, and construction of legitimacy, the research focused one of the biggest rural development projects in Afghanistan: the National Solidarity Program (NSP) that funds the community development projects

¹⁰⁹ Author's interview with Rona Tereen, the Director of Women's Affairs in Kandahar Provincial government, on 10 June 2008.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Author's interview with Anita Nirody, the Country Director of UNDP, on 29 June 2008.

¹¹² Ibid.

by establishing a Community Development Council (CDC) in each village across the country.

The NSP is one of the six initial national priority programs that were introduced under the National Development Framework in 2003.¹¹³ The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD) collaborated with the World Bank and initiated this program with a budget of 800 million USD that is planned to be spent by the end of 2009.¹¹⁴ The NSP is “by far the largest government program in the country in terms of financing and geographical reach.”¹¹⁵

There are two core objectives of the NSP: one is to reduce the poverty at the community level by establishing CDCs in almost all villages across Afghanistan and mobilizing the CDCs with participatory approaches; the second is to recreate the sense of national unity and reunification of each community.¹¹⁶ Each CDC can be established by the participation of at least 25 local villagers.

The key mechanism of the NSP is that after the CDC is established by local people, **the CDC itself can identify or choose projects that they want to have.** The implementation partners—mainly local and international NGOs—help the CDC to make designs and applications for the projects. If approved, each CDC can obtain economic projects that have a maximum budget of 60,000 USD.¹¹⁷

Because of the Afghan people’s strong desire and passion to obtain economic projects to improve their living conditions, the CDC projects drastically expanded in the last several years. According to MRRD, 20,782 CDCs were established across 34 provinces in Afghanistan by 24 May 2008, and MRRD aims to create about 32,000 CDCs in total by the end of 2009, when the “Phase II of NSP” is terminated.¹¹⁸ (The NSP “Phase I” started in 2003 and was terminated in 2006; the “Phase II” started in 2006 and will be terminated by the end of 2009.)

The NSP is funded largely through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and supported by numerous bilateral and multilateral donors. The NSP mobilized 463 million USD by May 2008.

How do the local Afghan people perceive the impacts of the CDC projects on their life? The opinion survey I conducted revealed a surprising support for the CDC projects among local Afghan people. It shows that **92% in Kandahar, 84% in Wardak, and 95% in Kapisa answered that they are satisfied with results of the CDC.** (Appendix 1, Q. 6). Why? A majority of people answered that it is because (1) they can make decisions about the projects they implement; (2) they can see improvement in their lives due to the CDC projects (Appendix 1, Q. 7). Many villagers I interviewed, including a villager in Kandahar province, argued that “the CDC project was only hope that we could see since the nation-building started in Afghanistan in 2001.”¹¹⁹ A local leader in Kapisa Province emphasized that “we are very happy that we start having electricity because of the small hydro energy generators constructed by the CDC projects. It substantially increased the trust of our

¹¹³ Brick 2008, 1.

¹¹⁴ Zakhilwal & Thomas 2008 & the author’s interview with one of directors in charge of NSP in MRRD in May 2008.

¹¹⁵ Zakhilwal & Thomas 2008, 161.

¹¹⁶ Author’s interview with one of directors in charge of NSP in MRRD in May 2008.

¹¹⁷ NSP Guideline by the MRRD.

¹¹⁸ Weekly Status Report of the National Solidarity Program by the MRRD on 24 May 2008.

¹¹⁹ Author’s interview with a villager from Daman district in Kandahar Province during my opinion survey on 9 June 2008.

community in the government.”¹²⁰ **It seems clear that in the economic development programs, local ownership does matter in improving their living conditions and enhancing the trust in the government, thus its legitimacy.**

Ehsan Zia, the Minister of MRRD, asserted that 95% to 98% of all CDC projects are properly maintained after they are implemented because “people are very enthusiastic about their projects they identified themselves.”¹²¹ Moreover, CDC projects are more likely to be protected by the community and more immune to insurgent attacks than other government projects, he emphasized. For example, “about 160 schools across the country were destroyed by the Taliban under the Karzai government, but no school that was build as a CDC project was destroyed by the Taliban. It is because the Taliban cannot afford to confront local people due to the support and popularity of people for their CDC projects.”¹²²

Problem of CDC Projects

The critical challenge for the CDC projects and NSP as a whole, though, is the sustainability of CDC projects. If the Afghan National Trust Fund stops sending funds to CDCs when the Phase II of NSP is completed at the end of 2009, can the CDCs still continue to function, especially to implement new community development projects?

There are two systematic studies with regard to the sustainability of the CDC projects. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and Jennifer Brick conducted intensive research about the sustainability of the CDCs in 32 villages across 16 districts in six provinces.¹²³ Based on their research, Brick concluded, “It is clear that without project funds, CDCs will disappear. The speed at which CDCs have begun to fade suggests that CDCs do not yet have strong roots in the community.”¹²⁴

Likewise, Zakhilwal and Thomas conducted research in 29 villages in five provinces and concluded, “Observations in the villages visited raise questions about the sustainability of CDCs; and it is this that could pose the biggest risk to local governance and community-based development. Within the international aid community and MRRD there is high hope for the CDCs, but their future depends on many complex realities. **If these CDCs fail, it will take a very long time to build up enough trust to enable such efforts to work again.**”¹²⁵

While there are some CDCs that have started collecting funds from villagers and tried to start their own projects, it would be very difficult for a majority of CDCs to keep implementing new projects if the funds from international donors stopped (It may happen in the end of 2009). At the same time, **a vast majority of Afghan people strongly desire the continuation of the CDC projects, while**

¹²⁰ Author’s interview with a villager in Kapisa Province during my opinion survey on 23 June 2008.

¹²¹ Author’s interview with Ehsan Zia, the Minister of the Rural Rehabilitation & Development on 31 May 2008.

¹²² Ibid. One concern, however, is the security of CDC projects is also threatened, especially in South because the Taliban distribute warning letters to the villages that if they cooperate for CDCs, they will be punished by the Taliban. One of the villagers in Kandahar Province showed me the warning letter that he received from the Taliban organization.

¹²³ Brick 2008

¹²⁴ Ibid., 52.

¹²⁵ Zakhilwal & Thomas 2008, 169.

many people also want to increase the budget of CDC projects (Appendix 1, Q. 9).

Recommendations

Based on the information and analyses above, I make recommendations on (1) the NSP and (2) international assistance in Afghanistan in general.

(1) With regard to NSP (and CDC projects), it is urgent to create an international fund mechanism to sustain the NSP that will keep the implementation of the CDC projects in each village.

The research suggests that the continuation of the CDC projects at the community level is vital in maintaining and increasing the trust of the people in the government, which started to be created through the implementation of CDC development projects. The termination of CDC projects would destroy the trust between people and the government if more than 30,000 CDCs stopped functioning after only one or two projects were implemented by each CDC.

In order to make CDC projects more sustainable (as the international community probably cannot afford to support CDCs forever), one of the key programs could be to encourage CDCs to initiate new projects that create opportunities for long-term employment, such as irrigation or food processing. **The possible vocational centers for reconciliation could be linked with long-term projects by CDCs.**

It is alleged that the Ministry of Finance is opposing the proposal by MRRD to continue the NSP after 2009. But the Minister of Finance, Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, refuted the allegation: “I do oppose the continuation of the NSP without reviewing the impacts of the NSP; thus, the impacts of NSP should be examined by an independent body, and we need to make a decision based on fair and objective reviews.”¹²⁶

Several studies, including this one, indicate that it is critical for the NSP to continue direct community investments in each village so that people can perceive the linkage between their lives and the government and then increase their confidence in the state regime in Afghanistan. The termination of the CDC projects, especially at the critical moment of the presidential election in 2009 and parliament elections in 2010, is extremely risky with regard to increasing the legitimacy of the government.

(2) With regard to the international assistance in general, the projects by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)—which are created by the international forces in each region and are one of the major parts of “external flow” that are directly spent by international actors—must have more substantial discussions with Afghan local governments at both provincial and district levels. The PRT projects need to be perceived as the result of collaboration between the local governments and the PRT so that the achievement of projects can increase the legitimacy of local governments.

¹²⁶ Author’s interview with Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance, on 28 June 2008.

Many local government officials complained that the PRT projects did not substantially contribute to the increase of trust in local governments in Afghanistan. A former governor in one province lamented, “I did not get any serious discussion from the PRT covering my province before the PRT implemented their projects; on the other hand, my proposals about the projects that could have been assisted by the PRT were never accepted by the PRT and continued to be rejected. I do not think that they understood the needs of our people and struggles of the local governments to increase the trust of people.”¹²⁷

The cooperation of the PRT and local government might delay the implementation of PRT projects; at the same time, the PRT guidelines clearly expresses that **“the mission of a PRT is to work with all available stakeholders and resources to bring stability to a population group by enabling the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and government institutions.”**¹²⁸ Maurits Jochems, the ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, strongly supports this principle: “We are learning the importance of respecting local authorities. There is now clear realization that we should stop the tendency of the PRT to build a monument when commanders would leave Afghanistan soon...It is very important to get local authorities such as provincial or district governors involved in many aspects of projects so that it can increase the visibility of the local governments in the reconstruction process.”¹²⁹ He emphasized, “Overall, we came here to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government.”¹³⁰

In return for providing local government with more visibility and involvement in the project implementation process, international actors must be allowed to strengthen monitoring projects, as reducing the perception of corruption is also crucial in restoring the trust of local governments.

The achievements of the PRT projects in improving the living conditions of Afghan people are substantial; a majority of Afghan villagers in my survey responded that their access to clinics, clean water, and roads have become better compared with three years ago (Appendix 1, Q. 2), and the PRT is making an important contribution to these improvements. It is time to change the ways of implementing individual projects and increase the collaboration with the local governments so that the PRT projects can more directly increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

¹²⁷ Author’s interview with a former governor in one province in Afghanistan, with the condition of anonymity, in June 2008.

¹²⁸ PRT Handbook revised in February 2007.

¹²⁹ Author’s interview with Maurits Jochems, Ambassador and NATO Senior Civil Representative in Afghanistan, on 19 June 2008.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

Chapter 5: Lesson from the Past in Afghanistan: Missed Opportunities?

The research also identified the hypothetical missed opportunities that might have substantially changed the course of the peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Although we cannot change the past, it is important to learn lessons from the past; those lessons give us precious insights on how to improve both ongoing and future peacebuilding efforts in the world, including the current effort in Afghanistan.

There are several missed opportunities that were expressed by top government and UN officials: (1) reconciliation with the Taliban in 2002 or 2003, (2) massive economic and social projects to improving living conditions in the first 6 months, (3) creation of a much simpler electoral system, (4) more roles for the UN in maintaining security, although this issue is most controversial.

Reconciliation With the Taliban in 2002 or 2003

It is amazing that a majority of top leaders of the Afghan government and UN officials share the view that they could have reconciled with even core Taliban members in 2002 or 2003, when the Taliban was very weak and marginalized; substantial factions of the Taliban would have surrendered their weapons and participated in the 2005 congress elections.

Lakdhar Brahimi, the former SRSG in Afghanistan, states officially that it was the biggest mistake for him not to start speaking with the Taliban in 2002. Responding to a newspaper question in 2006, he argued, **“One of my own biggest mistakes was not to speak to the Taliban in 2002 and 2003. It was not possible to get them in the tent at the Bonn Conference (in 2001) because of 9/11....But immediately after that, we should have spoken to those who were willing to speak to us.”**¹³¹

I asked many top Afghan government officials about this critical comment by Brahimi. Although the reasons they presented were slightly different, they almost unanimously shared the idea. **Eishen Zia, the Minister of MRRD**, who is very pessimistic about reconciliation with the core members of the Taliban in the current conditions, said, **“Brahimi’s argument was valid at that time, I mean, in 2002 and 2003, because at that time, al-Qaida was on the run, and the Taliban was on the run. They did not unite at that time....But we now have Pakistani Taliban who are clearly stating that they will continue the jihad against Afghanistan. And Pakistani Taliban emerged just recently as strong forces, organized by al-Qaida.”**¹³²

Jelani Popal, the Director General of the IDLG, responded, “Personally, I believe that reconciliation can work only when you are in a strong position. When you are weak, reconciliation is

¹³¹ Toronto Star, “Expert Advice on Afghanistan” on 14 September 2006.

¹³² Author’s interview with Ehsan Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), on 31 May 2008.

difficult... **In 2002 and 2003, reconciliation was possible because the government was strong, the security in Afghanistan was good, and the Taliban was very weak.** Unfortunately, when the Taliban was weak, we did not make any efforts to include them.”¹³³ He then added, “If we now start negotiations with the Taliban after they have become strong and serious threats, we might need to make a substantial concession, but we also need to make sure that the peace process or reconciliation process would not endanger the core values of our constitution...That was why it was a mistake not to start the negotiation with the Taliban when they were weak and desperate.”¹³⁴

Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance, principally agreed with Brahimi’s claim, but explained why it was difficult, especially for the international community, to accept the reconciliation with the Taliban at that time: “**Until recently, we actually took it for granted that the peace would continue in Afghanistan.** We went to London in 2006 for an international conference and I was sure that the international community thought that Afghanistan was a success story. There was no recognition at that time that something very difficult should be done to maintain the security in Afghanistan.”¹³⁵

Masoom Stanekzai, the advisor to the President and virtually No. 1 Afghan official in charge of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), was very explicit about this reconciliation issue. He stressed, “The timing must be critical for the peacebuilding and reconciliation. One of the biggest lessons from Afghan peacebuilding is that both the Afghan government and the international community did not start the reconciliation effort with the Taliban in 2002, 2003, or even 2004; the international community did not listen to us...It was so easy, for example in 2003, to reconcile or regroup the Taliban. It was the biggest missed opportunity. And that is the historical lesson from the Afghan peacebuilding.”¹³⁶ Stanekzai concluded, “**It is so crucial for peacebuilders to have reconciliation in the initial stage of peacebuilding, but people tend to start thinking about the reconciliation only when it becomes too late and only when governments cannot stop or control the insurgency.**”¹³⁷

Reconciliation in the initial stage of peacebuilding, when former enemies are very weak and marginalized, seems a key lesson for future peacebuilding. With regard to the current peacebuilding effort in Afghanistan, this lesson indicates that the international community and the Afghan government might need to recognize that they probably must pay higher costs now for reconciliation with insurgent groups, such as providing job opportunities to insurgents, creating high-level army and police, and negotiating with numerous individual tribes to invite them to the side of the government, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Massive Economic Projects to Improve Living Conditions in the First 6 Months

¹³³ Author’s interview with Jelani Popal, the Director General of Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), on 4 June 2008.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Author’s interview with Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance, on 28 June 2008.

¹³⁶ Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai, advisor to President & Vice Chairman of Disarmament and Reintegration (D&R) Committee, on 18 February 2008.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

There is a unified voice on how critical it is to improve the living conditions in the first 6 months after peacebuilding starts. But the international community tends to focus on political dimensions and forget about the importance of economic and social improvements in the initial stage. **Salvatore Lombardo, the Representative of UNHCR in Afghanistan**, insisted that “some observers argue that state builders should concentrate much more on delivering service to people in the initial stages of peacebuilding, and I tend to agree with this argument because in the place which has been devastated by years’ conflicts, **the delivery of services to citizens in the initial stage of state building is absolutely critical, maybe much more critical than having a constitution.**”¹³⁸

He also emphasized the importance of the timing: “The first six months is most important because you can enjoy good atmosphere and cooperation of people expecting a better future. On the other hand, without making individual citizens feel that a new system is making their lives different from those in the past, the state legitimacy would gradually disappear.”¹³⁹

There is a general observation that the peacebuilders tend to have too much emphasis on advancing the political process, such as conducting elections and creating new constitutions. The suggestion by Lombardo—the critical need to improve the living conditions of ordinary people in the initial stages of peacebuilding—should be recognized as a lesson for future peacebuilding.

This argument would raise the other question about how the delivery of services, or improvement of living conditions in initial stage of peacebuilding, should be conducted, especially in terms of respecting local ownership or the involvement of local citizens. The research then examined the question, for example, whether or not community-based development projects participated in and identified by local people, as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has conducted Community Development Councils (CDC) projects since 2003, can be implemented in the very initial stage of peacebuilding, even in the first six months of Afghan peacebuilding.

Many officials, who were in charge of the NSP, asserted that it was impossible to start such a big scale of projects as the NSP in the first six months of peacebuilding. “Due to the scale of the programs and the need for the coordination with international funds, it was too difficult, thus not realistic to start programs like NSP in the first six months of the peacebuilding.”¹⁴⁰

Sadako Ogata, the president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency and a former head of the UNHCR, also argued that “I visited Afghanistan for its reconstruction just after the Taliban regime was collapsed. And there was no government building or institutional capability left in Afghanistan at that time. It was not realistic to conduct assistance through the government when there was no functioning government; thus, **the importance is to transit the assistance projects that would be directly implemented by the international donors in the initial stage to the projects that have more emphasis on local ownership in later stages.**”¹⁴¹

In sum, it appears to be very critical to improve living conditions of people with massive economic

¹³⁸ Author’s interview with Salvatore Lombardo, Representative of the UNHCR in Afghanistan on 19 June 2008.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Author’s interview with one of directors in charge of the NSP with a condition of anonymity in 2008.

¹⁴¹ Author’s interview with Sadako Ogata, the president of Japan International Cooperation Agency and a former head of UNHCR on 4 June 2008.

projects that would be directly implemented by international peacebuilders in the very initial stage of post-conflict reconstruction (and the first six months could be an important target for international peacebuilders). At the same time, the international peacebuilders can start preparing for assistance projects that respect and utilize local ownership—for example, encouraging the local people to participate in identifying and implementing the projects—for the second stage of peacebuilding, as the peacebuilding efforts advance and state institutions start functioning.

Creating a Much Simpler Electoral System

The complexity of the electoral system in the new Afghan state is very prominent. There is a presidential election every five years; there is an election every five years for the Lower House members (250 members) who are selected by voting in each province; there are also several elections for selecting the members in the Upper House (100 members), as a third of the members in the Upper House are selected by the Provincial Councils in each province, a third of the members in the Upper House are selected by the District Councils in each district, and a third of the members are selected by the president.

In 2005, although there were elections for the Lower House members and elections for Provincial Councils in every province, the District Council elections could not be conducted because it was too difficult to line the border of more than 350 districts across Afghanistan. (As a result, two-thirds of the members in the Lower House were selected by the Provincial Councils.)

Afghanistan will face election years beginning in 2009. According to the current constitution, it will have a presidential election in 2009 and parliament elections in 2010 in which Afghans need to conduct various types of elections, such as choosing the Lower House members, choosing the Provincial Council members, choosing the District Council members, choosing 34 Upper House members from each Provincial Council all over the country, and choosing the other 34 Upper House members from numerous District Councils across the country. One international official in charge of elections lamented, “Who made this electoral system? It created too much burden for both Afghans and international organizations and became a big impediment for constructing state institutions.”¹⁴²

The research identified that in the process of creating the new Afghan constitution, which defines the basic structure of the Afghan electoral system, the members of the Afghan constitutional committee did not seriously consider the complexity of Afghan elections. The members thought that “the more elections they have, the more legitimacy the Afghan government will gain.”¹⁴³ According to an official who was involved in the whole process of creating the constitution, the constitutional committee members did not have serious discussion about the consequences of having a very complex electoral system in a state that was devastated by 23 years’ conflicts.

There was one draft of the constitution in which there was no Upper House in Parliament. In retrospect, it would have been much better to have one presidential election and one election for one

¹⁴² Author’s interview with a UN official covering elections, with a condition of anonymity, in 2008.

¹⁴³ Author’s interview with an official who was involved in the discussion of constitutional committee, with a condition of anonymity, in 2008.

parliament; it would substantially reduce the burden of conducting elections as well as simplify legislative processes. But this draft was dropped from the discussion in the committee, and the current electoral system was adopted by the new constitution.

This experience suggests that international peacebuilders, mainly the UN who is in charge of assisting the electoral process in the initial stage of peacebuilding, **need to assist local authorities to seriously consider the cost and burden of conducting elections, as well as to give them the best advice about a new electoral system that is simple and straightforward but enables them to have functioning elections and institutions.** As the initial costs of elections are frequently covered by the international community, the international actors must have the right to be substantially involved in making a good electoral system.

Role of the UN: UN Peacekeepers in Afghanistan?

Although deploying the UN peacekeepers in Afghanistan has not ever been seriously discussed, theoretically it was possible for the UN peacekeepers to play a major role in maintaining security in Afghanistan, especially in the aftermath of the 2002 collapse of the Taliban. The role of the UN in terms of maintaining security in post-conflict situations must be one of the most controversial—and important—issues, especially in its implication for other peacebuilding efforts in the world.

On the one hand, there is a strong conviction among European and U.S. military circles that they should never put their major force under the command of the UN because the UN is not efficient and reliable in commanding forces. In their view, it is important for NATO to be mandated by the UN Security Council but not commanded by the UN.

Maurits Jochems, the ambassador and senior civil representative of NATO in Afghanistan, told me that “it would be better to answer this particular question as Dutch ambassador, not as ambassador to ISAF. For Dutch MoD (Ministry of Defense), and it is the same for American MoD, British MoD, and quite a few other serious military players, there is no way that they will put their major forces into the command of the UN. Why?, because the UN militarily is not efficient and reliable.”¹⁴⁴ Because of the UN records in the past, especially in the genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia, the Dutch Ministry of Defense will never again allow the UN military to lead, he said.¹⁴⁵ He of course added that the traditional UN peacekeeping with the mandate of the UN Chapter VI is fine to be commanded by the UN, as it is to monitor peace in the borders with consent, as was shown in places such as Cyprus or Ethiopia. But as for the operations with the Chapter VII mandate, “Yes, it should be mandated by the UN Security Council, but we do operations by ourselves because we have more efficient military command.”¹⁴⁶

One military officer in charge of ISAF in Afghanistan also argued that “because the UN record in commanding forces is very bad and poor, as shown in Bosnia or Rwanda, if the UN took the

¹⁴⁴ Author’s interview with Maurits Jochems, Ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representative, on 19 June 2008.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

command in Afghanistan, the Americans would withdraw. In short, it is not realistic for the UN to have military command in this scale of battle area.”¹⁴⁷ Asked about why there are several big-scale UN peacekeeping operations in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Sudan, he claimed, “Maybe it is because NATO is not ready to commit their own forces to those peacebuilding operations in Africa.”

On the other hand, there is growing frustration and concern by some UN officials and aid workers in donor agencies that several different pillars of command systems by international actors in Afghanistan are causing many problems. **One critical problem is the matter of coordination.** One aid worker belonging to a major donor agency operating in Afghanistan stressed that “Because there are many different command pillars, such as ISAF, American Counterterrorism Operations (Operation for Enduring Freedom: OEF), the UN, and the Afghan government, it is too difficult to pursue one objective in Afghanistan.”¹⁴⁸

One Afghan UNAMA staff lamented, “Our mandate is too weak to advance some critical political programs, including reconciliation. If I had a few hundred UN peacekeepers, it would be possible for us to dispatch some peacekeepers in borders between tribes, stop conflicts, and establish some peace accords between tribes. But we do not have any force and police that other UN missions have in different post-conflict situations; thus, what we can do is very limited.”¹⁴⁹ As there is basically no way for the UN to influence the military operation by ISAF and OEF, “it is also very challenging for UNAMA to advance political programs and keep the trust of people, especially if international forces cause civilian casualties by their operations.”¹⁵⁰

The other issue is the matter of legitimacy. According to my own opinion survey, **70% in Kandahar, 98% in Wardak, and 98% in Kapisa answered that the United Nations should play a central role in commanding foreign military operations,** while 28% in Kandhar, 2% in Wardak, and 2% in Kapisa answered that it should be commanded by the U.S. or NATO (Appendix 1, Q. 13). The major reasons are Afghan people perceive that the UN is more neutral and credible because the UN is not representing the interest of individual foreign states (Appendix 1, Q. 15). When the UN has the substantial advantage of the acceptance of local people in specific regions, the UN peacekeepers, that hopefully include forces who share the culture or religion of people in host states, might be more effective in cooperating with local authorities and people.

When discussing this issue, it may be important to recognize that the mission of peacebuilding might be substantially different from the mission of peace enforcement operations. It is true that peace enforcement operations—international intervention to stop the conflicts and stabilize the situation in combat zones—have often been conducted by multinational forces authorized by international organizations, as it requires substantial military combat operations.¹⁵¹ But as for peacebuilding operations, which need to stay much longer in host states and to implement numerous political and

¹⁴⁷ Author’s interview with an international military officer in charge of ISAF, with a condition of anonymity, in 2008.

¹⁴⁸ Author’s interview with an official belonging to one of major aid agencies operating assistance program in Afghanistan, with a condition of anonymity, in 2008.

¹⁴⁹ Author’s interview with one Afghan UNAMA staff, with a condition of anonymity, in 2008.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Peace Enforcement Operation and its legitimacy is extensively discussed and examined in the recently published book *International Organizations and Peace Enforcement* (Coleman 2007).

sensitive programs, it might be more effective for the UN to play a central role even in maintaining security because **the Special Representative of the Secretary-General could command both military operations and political programs, pursuing unified objectives and goals.**

The role of the UN in commanding international forces should be one of the critical issues to be discussed for future peacebuilding activity and its legitimacy construction. However, it seems unrealistic for Afghanistan to have UN peacekeepers any time soon. With regard to current Afghan peacebuilding, it should be crucial to ensure that UNAMA plays a substantial role in coordinating military operations and political programs, as it is mandated by a UN Security Council resolution.¹⁵²

¹⁵² UN Security Council Resolution 1806, adopted on 20 March 2008.

Conclusion

Although it may be too early to draw general conclusions from one case study, two general principles could be addressed from the research in Afghanistan on the construction of domestic legitimacy in the process of peacebuilding assisted by international actors.

(1) Political processes and programs need to be monitored, implemented, and even supervised by international organizations, especially by the UN. Depending too much on local ownership without effective supervision is often counter-effective **with regard to political programs.** It is not because of the lack of capabilities of local people in host states, but because of the nature of post-conflict nation building: A credible third party needs to play a role in ensuring an impartial peace process and guaranteeing that the political rights of various factions are protected when they comply with elections or disarmament.

It is notable that the UN has very high trust and credibility in Afghanistan. With regard to the next election in Afghanistan, **70 % in Kandahar, 80% in Wardak, and 94% in Kapisa answered that Afghan authority and the UN should mainly conduct the election** (Appendix 1, Q. 29). Many local citizens argued that the presence of the UN can increase the credibility and fairness of the election.

This credibility of the UN might enable the UN to play a crucial role in other political programs, such as disarmament and reconciliation.

(2) Economic projects must be seen as government programs as much as possible. In other words, economic and social improvements should be seen as results of government efforts so that the improvements in people's daily lives can increase the legitimacy of the domestic government. In return, the international actors should be allowed to monitor government projects to prevent corruption.

At the initial stage of peacebuilding, though, it must be inevitable and recommended to have direct investment by international actors for quick impacts on improving the living conditions of local people in the host state; however, it is critical for international actors to start simultaneously designing assistance projects that respect local ownership, such as involvement and participation of local people in both identifying and implementing projects. The key is to have a smooth transit from the "more direct investment by international actors" to the "assistance programs conducted through the local government and people."

In addition to the specific policy recommendations, **I propose the creation of a new officer who is specifically responsible for understanding the perception and ideas of both domestic peacebuilders (such as domestic officials of interim authorities or local governments) and ordinary people in the future UN peacebuilding operations.** It should be critical to assess needs, perceptions, and hopes of local people about the policies of both domestic governments and international actors in the different stages of peacebuilding. In collaboration with the staff of UN missions and other NGOs, the operation cost for assessing perceptions of local people is not so

expensive (such as this research), but very critical in finding effective policies to construct the legitimacy of the new government.

It may be difficult to conduct systematic and statistically very rigid surveys in post-conflict situations, but it is still very important, I am convinced, to make best efforts to keep understanding the motives of local people and political stakeholders, who judge the policies of peacebuilders and make final decisions on compliance and then the construction of legitimacy.

Appendix 1

Results of Opinion Survey in Afghanistan in June 2008

(Place of Research)

Kandahar Province (Pashtun area in South Region): 50 persons from 6 different districts: Panjwayi (9), Daman (7), Dand (8), Arghandab (7), Spin Boldak (10), and Kandahar City (9), on 9 June 2008

Wardak Province (Pashtun area in Central Region): 102 persons from Jalrez district (51 persons) on 16 June 2008 and from Maidan Shahr district (51 persons) on 17 June 2008

Kapisa Province (Tajik area in Central Region): 108 persons from Kohistan 1 district (53 persons) on 23 June 2008 and from Koh Band district (55 persons) on 24 June 2008

(Methodology)

About 50 ordinary citizens gathered in either provincial centers or district centers for my research; I first explained the objectives of the research and confidentiality of their answers. After the presentation, my staff and staff from MRRD in Kandahar and UNAMA, Swedish Committee (NGO) and UNHABITAT in Kapisa and Wardak met each villager in separate rooms so that the individual meeting was confidential. Because of literacy issues, each staff read every sentence of the questions and answers, and asked interviewees for their choices. For the “why” questions, the staff asked “why” without reading options, heard their answers, and marked the closest options. I also participate in the opinion survey with my translator.

(Key Results)

Living Conditions, Resource Distribution, Government Service

2. Compared to three years ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?

A. Availability of medical clinic (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	58.0%	69.6%	94.4%
Same	26.0%	19.6%	3.7%
Worse	16.0%	8.8%	1.9%
Invalid		2.0%	

B. Availability of clean water (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	66.0%	50.0%	49.1%

Same	18.0%	42.2%	45.4%
Worse	14.0%	6.9%	5.6%
Invalid	2.0%	1.0%	

C. Electricity supply (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	10.0%	52.9%	47.2%
Same	28.0%	42.2%	49.1%
Worse	54.0%	2.9%	3.7%
Invalid	8.0%	1.0%	

D. Financial well-being of your household (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	36.0%	22.5%	28.7%
Same	16.0%	41.2%	49.1%
Worse	44.0%	35.3%	22.2%
Invalid	4.0%	1.0%	

E. Quality of your diet (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	14.0%	15.7%	36.1%
Same	6.0%	23.5%	39.8%
Worse	72.0%	60.8%	22.2%
Invalid			1.9%

F. Employment (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	36.0%	19.6%	23.1%
Same	16.0%	32.4%	39.8%
Worse	46.0%	46.1%	36.1%
Invalid	2.0%	2.0%	0.9%

G. Availability of school for girls (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	54.0%	69.6%	96.3%
Same	24.0%	18.6%	2.8%
Worse	22.0% *	11.8%	0.9%
Invalid			

* Although the majority of people in Kandahar answered “better” for school availability, in many districts, such as Spin Boldak and Panjwayi in Kandahar, many schools were already closed by attacks and threats of Taliban against schools; in these regions, half the people answered that the availability for girls had become worse. (In the Southern 5 provinces, more than 600 schools were closed because of Taliban attacks, according to the Minister of Education in June 2008)

H. Availability of school for boys (1 Better 2 Same 3 Worse)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Better	72.0%	88.2%	92.6%
Same	8.0%	5.9%	5.6%
Worse	16.0%	5.9%	1.9%
Invalid	4.0%		

3. If you have some conflicts with other people on personal issues, such as your land, water, and house, with whom you meet and discuss to solve these problems? (Multiple answers are possible)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Tribal Leaders	80.0%	92.2%	74.1%
Shura Elders	12.0%	46.1%	65.7%
District or Provincial Governor’s office	10.0%	63.7%	71.3%
Courts of Justice	8.0%	28.4%	3.7%
Afghan National Army	4.0%	0	0
Afghan National Polices	2.0%	2.0%	5.6%
Local Commanders	2.0%	0	0.9%
Invalid	14.0%	6.9%	6.5%

Local Ownership

4. Do you think that the creation of the new government in Afghanistan is currently led by Afghan people?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	28.0%	49.0%	48.1%
No	72.0%	51.0%	51.9%

5. If No, who is leading the creation of the new government? (Percentage of Total Participants)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
The United States	56.0%	46.1%	36.1%
The United Nations	10.0%	3.9%	7.4%
Many Donor States	2.0%	0	2.8%
Other	0	1.0%	0.9%

6. Are you satisfied with the CDC (Community Development Councils)?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	92.0%	84.3%	95.4%
No	8.0%	15.7%	4.6%

**7. If you are satisfied with the CDC, why? (open question)
(Multiple Answers are possible) (Percentage of the Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because Afghan people can make decisions on the projects.	34.0%	73.5%	63.9%
Because Afghan people can obtain money from foreign countries.	4.0%	42.2%	20.4%
Because Afghan people can see improvement in their lives due to CDC.	58.0%	50.0%	46.3%
Other	6.0%	6.9%	15.7%

8. If you are not satisfied with the CDC, why?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because the implementation of projects is too slow.	2.0%	4.9%	2.8%
Because the budgets of projects are too small.	4.0%	5.9%	0.9%
Because Afghan people cannot decide on the projects that they want.	0	9.8%	0.9%
Other	0	3.9%	2.8%

9. What do you hope about future CDC projects ? (Open Question)
(Multiple Answers are possible)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
I want CDC projects to be maintained and sustainable.	60.0%	84.3%	73.1%
I want CDC projects to be replaced by other Government construction projects.	0	11.8%	11.1%
I want CDC projects to have more budgets.	30.0%	73.5%	83.3%
I want CDC projects to be run by only Afghan people.	44.0%	48.0%	47.2%
Other	8.0%	7.8%	15.7%

Use of Force by Foreigners

10. Do you support the current use of force by the US and NATO ?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	44.9%	31.0%	57.9%
No	55.1%	69.0%	42.1%

11. If you support the current use of force by the US and NATO, why?
(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because it is necessary for the US and NATO to destroy insurgent groups, including the Taliban.	6.0%	17.6%	29.6%
Because it is only the US and NATO which can fight against the Taliban.	2.0%	7.8%	14.8%
Because it is only the US and NATO which can maintain the social order in Afghanistan.	10.0%	7.8%	15.7%
Because Afghan national army and Afghan national police are too weak.	30.0%	9.8%	10.2%
Other	4.0%	0	16.7%

12. If you do not support the current use of force by the US and NATO, why?
(Multiple Answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because the US and NATO killed and wounded Afghan civilians.	20.0%	59.8%	21.3%
Because the US and NATO did not follow the rule of law, using force arbitrarily.	24.0%	52.9%	20.4%

Because it is better for the Afghan army or police, not the US or NATO, to use force.	28.0%	48.0%	18.5%
Because the current use of force by the US and NATO will not create peace.	8.0%	37.3%	15.7%
Other	4.0%	2.0%	9.3%

Role of the UN

13. Do you think that the UN should play a central role in commanding foreign military operations, or do you think that NATO or the United States should play a central role?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
The UN	70.0%	98.0%	98.1%
The US or NATO	28.0%	2.0%	1.9%
Invalid	2.0%		

14. Do you think that the UN is more credible than other foreign states in terms of creating good government in Afghanistan?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes, the UN is more credible than other foreign states.	80.0%	95.0%	99.1%
No, the UN is less credible than other foreign states.	6.0%	1.0%	0
The UN has the same credibility as other foreign states.	14.0%	4.0%	0.9%

**15. If you think the UN is *more credible* than other foreign states, why?
(Multiple Answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because the UN is established by the resolution of the UN Security Council.	24.0%	55.9%	63.0%
Because the UN personnel are from many different regions in the world.	22.0%	60.8%	74.1%
Because the UN is neutral to every faction in Afghanistan, as the UN has no specific interest to support some specific factions.	32.0%	64.7%	63.0%
Because the UN is providing much assistance to Afghan people.	16.0%	50.0%	41.7%
Other	4.0%	0	1.9%

**16. If you think the UN is *less credible* or as credible as other states, why?
(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because the UN is only serving big countries, like the United States.	6.0%	2.0%	0
Because the UN consists largely of Western people.	4.0%	1.0%	0.9%
Because the UN is not neutral to every faction in Afghanistan.	6.0%	1.0%	0
Because the UN is not providing enough assistance to Afghan people.	8.0%	2.0%	0
Other	0	1.0%	0

Inclusiveness and Reconciliation

17. Some might argue that the Afghan government should allow the Taliban to participate in the next election if they surrender their weapons. Do you support this idea or not?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	100.0%	96.1%	80.4%
No	0	3.9%	19.6%

18. In order to establish peace in Afghanistan, what is the priority?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Reconciliation with insurgent groups, including Taliban.	93.6%	98.0%	86.3%
Prosecuting and punishing war criminals, including Taliban leaders.	6.4%	1.0%	4.9%
Destroying insurgent groups, including Taliban, by military actions.	0	0	2.9%
Other	0	1.0%	5.9%

19. Do you support the idea of coalition government between Karzai and the Taliban?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	98.0%	98.0%	69.4%
No	2.0%	2.0%	30.6%

20. If you support the coalition, why?

(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because it is necessary to establish peace in Afghanistan.	94.0%	97.1%	69.4%
Because I am favorable to Taliban.	4.0%	1.0%	5.6%
Other	6.0%	1.0%	2.8%

21. If you do not support the coalition, why?

(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because the Taliban should be destroyed.	0	0	3.7%
Because the Taliban should be punished because of its atrocities.	0	0	5.6%
Because the Taliban will occupy the government by violence in the future, even if they started coalition in peaceful ways.	2.0%	1.0%	3.7%
Other	0	1.0%	20.4%

Security Reform & Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

22. Do you think your daily life has become more dangerous under the current Afghan government, compared with your daily life under the Taliban government?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes, my daily life has become more dangerous under the current government than under the Taliban.	73.5%	63.7%	5.6%
No, my daily life has become less dangerous (become safer) under the current government than under the Taliban.	26.5%	25.5%	86.0%
I feel as safe under the current police and army as under the Taliban.	0	10.8%	8.4%

23. Some might argue that it is necessary for local commanders in your district to keep their weapons even if the central government asks them to surrender their weapons and offers economic projects to districts where commanders surrender their weapons. Do you agree with the idea of keeping weapons?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes, I agree that the local commanders should keep their weapons	22.0%	0	2.8%
No, local commanders should surrender their weapons.	78.0%	100.0%	97.2%

**24. If you agree that local commanders should *keep* their weapons, why?
(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because it is necessary for commanders to protect their communities.	14.0%	0	2.8%
Because we cannot trust the Afghan national police and army.	10.0%	0	0
Because we might need to fight against the Taliban in the future.	6.0%	0	0
Other	0	0	0

**25. If you think that commanders should *surrender* their weapons, why?
(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because our districts can obtain economic projects if commanders surrender their weapons.	34.0%	82.4%	62.0%
Because the national army and police can protect their districts and community.	34.0%	68.6%	52.8%
Because there is no fear that these commanders need to fight against the Taliban.	2.0%	15.7%	8.3%
Other	16.0%	10.8 %	25.0%

Note: Logic of Answer “B” does not necessarily mean that people think that current police and army can protect their communities; they rather think (or hope) that once commanders of illegal armed groups disband them and surrender weapons, the safety and order of their communities can be established and police will start functioning .

Elections

26. Do you think that the previous parliamentary election in 2005 was *free and fair*?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Yes	60.0%	84.2%	55.6%
No	40.0%	15.8%	44.4%

**27. If you think it was *free and fair*, why?
(Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Because I trusted the Afghan government.	38.0%	39.2%	24.1%
Because the UN was involved in the election.	20.0%	65.7%	37.0%
Other	4.0%	4.9%	4.6%

**28. If you think it was not free and fair, why?
 (Multiple answers are possible) (Percentage of Total Participants)**

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
People were afraid to vote for the person of their choice.	2.0%	4.9%	9.3%
People were afraid to run for office.	0	6.9%	6.5%
People were buying votes.	12.0%	10.8%	30.6%
There was cheating in the vote count	22.0%	13.7%	36.1%
Women were not able to vote because their husbands did not allow them to go.	6.0%	2.9%	11.1%
Other	4.0%	1.0%	0

29. Who should mainly conduct the next election in Afghanistan?

	Kandahar	Wardak	Kapisa
Only the Afghan authority.	8.5%	18.0%	5.8%
Afghan authority and the UN.	70.2%	80.0%	94.2%
Afghan authority and the US and NATO.	21.3%	2.0%	0

Appendix 2

Hypothesis on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding

Hypothetical Factors that might have impacts on creating legitimate government

1. Role of the UN
2. Inclusiveness
3. Local Ownership
4. Resource Distribution
5. Use of Force

Credibility as Impartial

Compliance

Noncompliance

(with Election, Constitution, Demobilization)

Repeated Compliance

Repeated Noncompliance

(Change of Interest & Identities)

Legitimate Government

Erosion of Government

Appendix 3

Acronyms

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Program
ANP	Afghan National Police
CDC	Community Development Council
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
IAG	Illegally Armed Group
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
<i>Shura</i>	Afghan local council of elders
SRS	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programs

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